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much more. Some of these rules do a great deal of good, but others might be poorly 
chosen, perhaps because the choice architects who select them are insufficiently 
informed, perhaps because they are self-interested, perhaps because one size does not 
fit all. The existence of heterogeneity argues against impersonal default rules. The 
obvious alternative to impersonal default rules, of particular interest when individual 
situations are diverse, is active choosing, by which people are asked or required to 
make decisions on their own. The choice between impersonal default rules and 
active choosing depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. If 
active choosing were required in all contexts, people would quickly be overwhelmed; 
default rules save a great deal of time, making it possible to make other choices and 
in that sense promoting autonomy. Especially in complex and unfamiliar areas, 
impersonal default rules have significant advantages. But where people prefer to 
choose, and where learning is both feasible and important, active choosing may be 
best, especially if people’s situations are relevantly dissimilar. At the same time, it is 
increasingly possible for private and public institutions to produce highly personal-
ized default rules, which reduce the problems with one-size-fits-all defaults. In 
principle, personalized default rules could be designed for every individual in the 
relevant population. Collection of the information that would allow accurate 
personalization might be burdensome and expensive, and might also raise serious 
questions about privacy. But at least when choice architects can be trusted, person-
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Consider the following: 
 
1. Some people have been interested in increasing consumers’ use of 
“green energy”—energy sources that do not significantly contribute to 
air pollution, climate change, and other environmental problems. While 
such energy sources are available in many places, relatively few people 
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choose them (notwithstanding the fact that in response to questions, 
many say that they would do so1). Nonetheless, two communities in 
Germany do show strikingly high levels of green energy use—well over 
90%.2 This is a dramatic contrast to the level of participation in green 
energy programs in other German towns, which was in a recent time 
period around 1%.3 The reason for the difference is that in those two 
communities, people are automatically enrolled in green energy pro-
grams, and they have to opt out.4 
 
2. In Germany, about 12% of people consent to be organ donors, whereas 
in Austria, the rate is 99.98%.5 We might speculate that this significant 
difference stems from different cultures, different norms, or extraordi-
narily effective educational campaigns in Austria. The speculation 
would be wrong. Instead, the difference results from law and more par-
ticularly from the default rule.6 In Austria, consent is presumed, subject 
to opt out.7 In Germany, consent is not presumed, and people have to 
opt in.8 
 
3. In the United States, savings rates have often been quite low, in part 
because people have delayed enrollment in pension plans.9 A number of 
employers have produced significant increases in savings through one 
simple initiative: make enrollment automatic, subject to opt out. The 
 
1 Daniel Pichert & Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults: Information Presentation and 
Pro-environmental Behaviour, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 63, 64 (2008). This difference is something 
of a mystery. It might be a product of the fact that it is not easy to find and select green energy, or 
it might be a product of the default rule. Alternatively, the survey setting may produce somewhat 
artificial answers, in which people simply say “yes” but do not really mean it, especially if green 
energy is costly. 
2 Id. at 66. 
3 Id. at 64. 
4 Id; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics 
and Environmental Protection, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/id=2245657 (discussing green defaults in Germany). 
5 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 1338 (2003) 
(bottom figure). 
6 DUNCAN J. WATTS, EVERYTHING IS OBVIOUS: ONCE YOU KNOW THE ANSWER 30-
31 (2011); see also Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default (discussing various 
European opt-in organ donor programs), in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 417, 
417-18 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
7 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 5, at 1338. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, In and Out, Off and On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2013, at F1 
(noting that only twenty-six percent of all U.S. workers were enrolled in traditional pension 
plans). 
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result of this initiative has been to increase participation rates dramati-
cally.10 For retirement savings, automatic enrollment appears to have a 
far larger effect than even substantial tax incentives—a truly remarkable 
finding.11 
 
Those who devise default rules are choice architects, in the sense that they 
design the social background against which choices are made.12 It is not 
possible to dispense with a social background, and some kind of choice 
architecture is therefore inevitable. Moreover, default rules, even or perhaps 
especially if they appear to be invisible, count as prime “nudges,” under-
stood as interventions that maintain freedom of choice, that do not impose 
mandates or bans, but that nonetheless incline people’s choices in a particu-
lar direction.13 A GPS is a simple example of a nudge; a disclosure require-
ment falls in the same category.14 Default rules are canonical nudges. 
When private or public institutions establish a default rule, they do not 
force anyone to do anything. On the contrary, they maintain freedom of 
choice.15 Whether people must opt out or opt in, they are permitted to do so 
as they see fit.16 What is striking and somewhat (though decreasingly) 
mysterious is that default rules nonetheless have a large impact, because 
they tend to stick.17 If a private or public institution seeks to alter outcomes, 
 
10 See, e.g., SHLOMO BENARTZI, SAVE MORE TOMORROW 42-45 (2012) (highlighting the 
impact of employer-implemented “Auto-Takeoff” programs on employee participation in 
retirement plans).  
11 Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement Savings Accounts: 
Evidence from Denmark 38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18565, 2012), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18565; see also Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 
Behavioral Economics and the Retirement Savings Crisis, 339 SCIENCE 1152, 1152 (2013) (offering a 
valuable discussion of retirement savings rates and the effect of auto-enrollment). 
12 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 3 (2008). 
13 Id. at 6; see also Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 694, 716 (2006) (offering an illuminating example of how nudges and default 
rules can be used in the domain of exercise). 
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE 
L.J. 1826, 1855, 1866 (2013) (detailing how GPS systems and disclosure requirements act as nudges 
by informing people’s choices). 
15 The assumption here is that opting in and opting out are both easy and essentially costless. 
Freedom of choice is limited insofar as there are costs in switching from the default rule. Id. at 
1881-82. 
16 But see RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES 83-86 (2012) (arguing that some 
choice-preserving measures lack easy reversibility and resemble forms of hard paternalism); see 
also Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1893-94 (noting that soft paternalistic measures like graphic 
warnings may become psychologically ingrained and hard to reverse). 
17 See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Defaults and Donation Decisions, 78 TRANS-
PLANTATION 1713, 1714 (2004) (“[D]ecision makers might believe that defaults are suggestions by 
the policy maker, implying a recommended action.”). 
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switching the default rule may be a highly effective route—perhaps more 
effective than significant economic incentives (as in the case of retirement 
savings).18 Such incentives certainly matter, but sometimes people ignore 
them, especially if they have other things to which to attend.19 People 
sometimes ignore default rules too, but that can be an opportunity, not a 
problem.20 Default rules stick when and because people ignore them. 
It follows that with respect to health care, consumer protection, the 
availability of organs, energy use, environmental protection, mortgages, 
savings, and much more, the choice of the default rule is exceedingly 
important. Public-spirited or self-interested people in both the private and 
public spheres can and do use default rules to produce outcomes that they 
deem desirable.21 
One of the most important tasks of a legal system is to establish default 
rules. Indeed, many policies operate through default rules, and contract law 
consists in large part of such rules.22 What happens if the parties are silent 
on whether employees may be fired only “for cause,” or instead for whatever 
reason the employer deems fit? A default rule might specify the answer, and 
it might well stick.23 In the law of contract, people often do not contract 
around default rules even if it is relatively costless for them to do so. Of 
course, some legal rules are mandatory; they do not merely set the default.24 
Employees are not allowed to opt out of the prohibition on racial discrimination 
 
18 The greater success of default rules in altering outcomes can be seen in the context of 
retirement savings. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 11, at 1152. 
19 Cf. Andrew Caplin & Daniel J. Martin, Defaults and Attention: The Drop Out Effect 16-19 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17988, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w17988 (positing that informative defaults lead individuals to “drop out” and pay less 
attention to the choices they make). 
20 Id. at 2-3 (contrasting the opportunities provided by default rules with those provided by 
active choice). 
21 See, e.g., Liz Gannes, Pinterest Now Tracks Everybody by Default, but You Can Opt Out, 
ALL THINGS D ( July 26, 2013), http://allthingsd.com/20130726/pinterest-now-tracks-everybody-
by-default-but-you-can-opt-out (highlighting a social media site’s recently implemented tracking 
system that allows the site to track the preferences of both site users and nonusers to create a more 
user-friendly experience). 
22 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-88 (1989) (noting the pervasiveness of default rules like the 
warranty of merchantability and straight voting under corporate statutes). 
23 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 625-30 (1998) (discussing how preexisting defaults alter personal preferences); see also 
Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1783, 1789-90 (1996) (discussing how the common law intervened when parties failed to 
specify the bases for which an employer could terminate the employer–employee relationship). 
24 In contrast to default rules, these rules have been termed “immutable rules” that cannot be 
changed contractually. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 22, at 87. 
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or sexual harassment.25 But even in sensitive and controversial contexts, 
default rules might be important. For age discrimination, for example, the 
United States allows people to waive their rights at the point of retirement, 
subject to certain constraints.26 
In this Article, I have two major goals. The first is to provide a general 
overview of what we now know about default rules—about when they have 
large effects and when they do not, and exactly why. In some cases, 
preferences do not antedate the default rule, or stand apart from it; they are 
constructed by it.27 It is for this reason, among others, that default rules 
serve as a highly attractive alternative to incentives as a means of altering 
outcomes—at once less expensive and more effective.28 Indeed, and because 
they specify a particular outcome in the (often likely) event of inaction, 
default rules can have a much larger effect than incentives.29 Choice archi-
tects may well be able to use default rules to produce outcomes that could 
otherwise be achieved only through substantial expenditures of resources. 
Indeed, both private and public institutions are already doing exactly that. 
The second goal is to make some progress toward understanding the 
choice among three alternatives: impersonal default rules, active choosing, 
and personalized default rules. In countless contexts, choice architects select 
one of these options. An impersonal default rule applies to all of a relevant 
population, establishing what happens if people do nothing. By contrast, 
active choosing asks people to make an explicit choice among the various 
options. Active choosing might be purely voluntary, as in the case of items 
in a grocery store, or it might be required, in the sense that people must 
make a choice in order to receive a benefit or to avoid a sanction. A 
personalized default rule attempts to distinguish among members of the 
relevant population, ensuring (in the extreme case) that each individual 
receives a default rule that fits his or her particular situation. 
 
25 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006) 
(prohibiting sex and race discrimination in the workplace under federal law). 
26 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006). Note that the right is waivable for past violations, but not 
for future violations. 
27 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 425 (discussing how default rules might over-
come organ shortages and encourage donation). 
28 Id. Another study finds that a default rule has a far greater effect than significant economic 
incentives in promoting savings, as reflected in the authors’ suggestion: “[A]utomatic contribu-
tions are more effective at increasing savings rates than price subsidies for three reasons: (1) 
subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (2) they generate substantial crowdout 
conditional on response, and (3) they do not influence the savings behavior of passive individuals, 
who are least prepared for retirement.” Raj Chetty et al., supra note 11, at 2. 
29 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 425. 
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Most default rules are impersonal, in the sense that they do not distin-
guish among members of large groups to which they apply. Impersonal 
default rules might be chosen on several grounds. Perhaps there are no 
relevant differences among members of the groups affected by such rules, 
and hence impersonality is not damaging; personalized rules would be 
pointless. Perhaps choice architects lack the information that would justify 
greater personalization, and hence impersonality is the only approach that is 
feasible. Perhaps active choosing would be an unnecessary and unhelpful 
burden, producing confusion and frustration, and wasting time and effort, 
without improving outcomes. For these reasons, impersonal default rules 
may be the best approach, all things considered. 
As we will see, however, active choosing can have significant advantages 
over impersonal default rules, especially when choice architects are ill-
informed or untrustworthy and the relevant population is diverse. In the 
face of diversity, active choosing may reduce the mistakes associated with 
impersonal default rules. It may also promote learning and the development 
of new understandings, preferences, and values. If choice architects lack an 
accurate understanding of people’s situations, or if they have their own 
agendas, it may be best to insist on active choosing. Those who emphasize 
the informational deficits faced by government might well favor active 
choosing.30 While default rules allow people to opt out, they might not do 
so even if opting out is in their best interest. For the same reasons that 
default rules matter, opt-outs might be rare, or at least insufficiently fre-
quent, even if and when they are desirable.31 
Unfortunately, active choosing can also impose high costs. Life is short 
and people are busy. If they were required to engage in active choosing in 
the many domains in which they now benefit from default rules, they would 
end up having time for little else.32 For many people, life is good in part 
because a series of desirable default rules are in place, ensuring that if they 
do nothing at all, things will go fine.33 Default rules can promote both 
welfare and autonomy. Societies overlook this point at their peril. To be 
 
30 See F.A. Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524-25 (1945) 
(discussing the problems that incomplete information can pose for decisionmakers). 
31 REBONATO, supra note 16, at 118-19. Note the importance of automatic escalation to accom-
pany automatic enrollment to ensure that automatic enrollment does not produce low savings 
rates. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 11, at 1152. 
32 See, e.g., Anuj K. Shah et al., Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 SCIENCE 682, 682 
(2012) (addressing the competition for an individual’s attention and its impact on decisionmaking). 
33 See ABHIJIT BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS 64-68 (2011) (high-
lighting how nudges can start positive feedback loops in behavior that remain over time). 
Sunstein_LRO.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  12/12/2013 2:22 PM 
2013] Deciding by Default 9 
 
sure, learning can be important, but in many domains, it is not especially 
important to learn, especially because life is short. 
In complex areas, active choosing might also lead to errors, as people 
make decisions that do not serve their own interests. Default rules may 
produce significantly better outcomes. If private or public institutions 
require active choosing, they might impose large burdens on themselves and 
on those with whom they interact, and the result might be to make people 
worse off. To be sure, these objections are not always serious, let alone 
decisive; free societies do not default people into either marriage or votes.34 
But in some contexts, the objections do have a great deal of force. 
The great promise of personalized default rules is that they might elimi-
nate the problems associated with impersonal ones without imposing the 
burdens, costs, and potential mistakes of active choosing. As default rules 
become more personalized, the comparative advantages of active choosing 
start to diminish, because personalized approaches can handle the problem 
of heterogeneity without requiring people to act at all. In many areas, 
personalized default rules promise to confer large social benefits. At the 
same time, such rules do not promote learning, and they may serve to 
narrow rather than broaden people’s horizons, by promoting outcomes that 
are consistent with their past choices. In addition, it can be burdensome and 
expensive for choice architects to produce accurate personalized default 
rules, and such rules might be used opportunistically by those who are 
motivated by their own self-interest, rather than the interests of potential 
choosers. Personalized default rules might also create serious risks to 
personal privacy. 
My basic conclusion is that the choice among impersonal default rules, 
active choosing, and personalized default rules cannot be made in the 
abstract. To know which is best, choice architects need to investigate the 
costs of decisions and the costs of errors. Four propositions are clear. First, 
impersonal default rules should generally be preferred to active choosing 
when the context is confusing and unfamiliar, when people would prefer not 
to choose, when learning is not important, and when the population is not 
heterogeneous along any relevant dimension. Second, active choosing should 
generally be preferred to impersonal default rules when choice architects 
lack relevant information, when the context is familiar, when people would 
actually prefer to choose (and hence choice is a benefit rather than a cost), 
when learning matters, and when there is relevant heterogeneity. Third, 
 
34 For a detailed discussion of default rules in the context of marriage, see generally Eliza-
beth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 1307 (2009). 
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personalized default rules should generally be preferred to impersonal ones 
in the face of relevant heterogeneity. Fourth, personalized default rules (if 
accurate and in the face of heterogeneity) have significant advantages over 
active choosing because they produce benefits without requiring people to 
devote the time and effort to choosing;35 hence personalized default rules 
deserve serious consideration whenever choice architects are both informed 
and trustworthy, at least if safeguards are in place to protect privacy.36 
One of my basic claims is that in many domains, personalized default 
rules are the wave of the future, and for good reason. In ordinary life, family 
members and friends adopt, every day and in ways large and small (and 
often unconsciously), the functional equivalent of personalized default rules 
by assuming that people will want in the future what they have wanted in 
the past—or perhaps that they will want the same kinds of variety and 
surprise in the future that they have enjoyed in the past. For example, 
spouses and close friends select default options for restaurants, vacation 
spots, romance, and even conversations, subject to opt-out. If people like 
routine, spouses and friends choose routine as the default; if people like 
surprises, they choose surprises. As information accumulates about people’s 
actual choices, many private and public institutions will be in a position to 
provide personalized default rules.37 
A target of the discussion—one that I leave mostly implicit—is the idea 
that government legitimately interferes with private choices only to prevent 
“harm to others.” In a famous passage, John Stuart Mill insisted, 
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better 
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion 
of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.38  
 
35 See Daniel G. Goldstein et al., Nudge Your Customers Toward Better Choices, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Dec. 2008, at 99, 99-100 (providing real-world examples where the selection of specific 
default rules by businesses improved the customer experience). 
36 Id. at 101. A qualification is that personalized default rules do not promote learning; active 
choosing is preferable on that count. 
37 See Emir Kamenica et al., Helping Consumers Know Themselves, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 417, 
422 (2011) (highlighting how improvements in technologies allow companies to learn more about 
their customers and institute default rules to match customer habits). 
38 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (2d ed. 1863), reprinted in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF 
JOHN STUART MILL: ON LIBERTY, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, AND UTILITARIANISM 3, 11-
12 (Dale E. Miller ed., 2002).  
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This passage raises many questions of interpretation, but it must engage 
with the fact that public institutions, no less than private ones, establish 
default rules, and these represent an exercise of power. Mill did not discuss 
default rules, and perhaps such rules can be squared with his basic account. 
Certainly such rules do not “compel” anyone to do or to forbear. But choice 
architects often select default rules on the ground that they help to produce 
decisions that will make people happier, and are either wise or right. 
Whether this is a point against such rules and in favor of active choosing 
requires careful consideration. 
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows. Part II explores 
why default rules matter, emphasizing the roles of inertia, suggestion, and 
loss aversion. Part III discusses defaults that do not stick. It shows that 
when people have clear preferences that antedate the default rule, they may 
well go their own way. Part IV investigates how to choose a default rule. It 
urges that the central goal should be to identify the approach that informed 
choosers would select—a proposition that raises both empirical and concep-
tual difficulties. Part V investigates the problem of bad defaults. Part VI 
turns to active choosing and the circumstances in which it is desirable. Part 
VII explores personalized default rules and suggests that they are, in many 
ways, the wave of the future. The Conclusion offers a general accounting. 
I. WHY DO DEFAULT RULES STICK? 
A. The Remarkable Power of Defaults 
To appreciate the importance and potential of default rules, it will be 
useful to provide a few additional illustrations. For the moment, we shall be 
dealing only with impersonal default rules. In due course, we shall explore 
their limitations as well, and turn to more personalized alternatives. 
1. Bean Sprout and Soy Cheese Sandwiches 
In 2011, I helped to organize a White House conference on information 
disclosure. Conference materials were sent out in advance to the three 
hundred registrants, who came from more than sixty agencies in the U.S 
government. In those materials, people were told that unless they specifically 
requested otherwise, they would receive the healthy lunch option. The 
materials explained: “Healthy options for lunch may include, but are not 
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limited to, a bean sprout and soy-cheese sandwich on gluten-free soda 
bread.”39  
Most people are not enthusiastic about the idea of bean sprout and soy-
cheese sandwiches, and it is doubtful that many people actually wanted 
them. But eighty percent of attendees failed to opt out. On the morning of 
the event, the participants were not exactly thrilled to learn that most of 
them had “selected” the bean sprout and soy cheese sandwich for lunch.40 
The good news is that people were not held to their apparent “selections”; 
they ended up with pretty good sandwiches.41 Still, it is noteworthy that the 
well-educated participants ended up signing up, by default, for a quite 
unappealing meal. 
2. Insurance 
In the context of auto insurance, an unplanned, natural experiment 
showed that default rules can be very “sticky.”42 Pennsylvania offered a 
default program containing a full right to sue and a relatively high premium; 
purchasers could elect to switch to a new plan by “selling” the more ample 
right to sue and paying a lower premium.43 By contrast, New Jersey created 
a system in which the default insurance program for motorists included a 
relatively low premium and no right to sue; purchasers were allowed to 
deviate from the default program and to purchase the right to sue by 
choosing a program with that right and also a higher premium.44  
In both cases, the default rule tended to stick. A strong majority accepted 
the default rule in both states, with only about twenty percent of New Jersey 
drivers acquiring the full right to sue, and seventy-five percent of Pennsyl-
vanians retaining that right. Experiments confirm this basic effect, showing 
that the value of the right to sue is much higher when it is presented as part 
of the default package.45 In a testimonial to the economic importance of 
defaults, an estimate suggests that the selection of the default in Pennsylvania 
 
39 Richard Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Customers, HARV. BUS. REV. 
Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 4 (describing the experiment). 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions [here-
inafter Framing], in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224, 238 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000); see also Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild (asserting that default 
rules establish a “reference point” from which people do not like to move), in CHOICES, VALUES, 
AND FRAMES, supra, at 288, 294-95; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 106, 113 (2002) (explaining the effect of default rules in employment law). 
43 Framing, supra note 42, at 238. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 235-38. 
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produced $140 million annually in additional insurance payments—and an 
aggregate amount of $2 billion since 1991.46 In the same vein, a natural field 
experiment at a large Swedish University found a large reduction in the use 
of paper as a result of a double-sided default for printing—with a significant 
and immediate effect in the form of a fifteen percent drop in paper con-
sumption, and with that effect staying stable over time.47 
3. Privacy 
We are in the midst of a great deal of discussion of privacy rights on the 
Internet. Strong views are held on all sides. Some people believe that there 
should be a strong presumption in favor of privacy, to be overcome only by 
explicit statement of consent. On this view, the default rule should be 
protective of privacy. Other people believe that information sharing is an 
affirmative good and that privacy safeguards can create a kind of prisoner’s 
dilemma, in which individually rational choices produce collective harm (in 
the form of reduced information about consumer goods, social risk, and 
political affairs). On this view, the default rule should support information 
sharing. Whatever the outcome of these debates, there is every reason to 
think that privacy rights and information sharing will be greatly affected by 
the default rule.  
Suppose that a public or private institution says that information about 
your behavior (for example, the websites that you visit) will not be shared 
with anyone unless you click on a button to allow information sharing. Now 
suppose that the same institution says that such information will be shared 
unless you click on a button to forbid such sharing. Will the results be the same? 
Far from it.48  
If people are asked whether they want to sacrifice privacy and opt in to 
information sharing, a lot of them will either ignore the question (perhaps 
because they are busy, inattentive, or distracted, or do not want to focus 
 
46 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 417.  
47 See Johan Egebark & Mathias Ekström, Can Indifference Make the World Greener? 3 (Re-
search Inst. Of Ind. Econ., Working Paper No. 975, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
id=2324922. 
48 See Eric Johnson et al., Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out, 13 MAR-
KETING LETTERS 5, 9 (2002) (highlighting that rates of participation in online studies were 
drastically different depending on whether participation was framed as an opt-in or opt-out); see 
also Rebecca Balebako et al., Nudging Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices (2011) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/pgl/paper6.pdf (reviewing 
the literature on nudges in privacy decisionmaking). For some significant qualifications, see 
Lauren Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/id=2349766. 
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on it) or decline (perhaps on the ground that if their privacy is now 
protected, they do not want to sacrifice that protection). In either case, 
their information will not be shared. If, by contrast, people are asked 
whether they want to opt out of information sharing and protect their 
privacy, a lot of them will also ignore the question, or decline, perhaps on 
the ground that they might not want to lose the potential advantages of 
such sharing—especially if they have to think a little bit, read something 
complicated, and form a preference in order to decide whether to switch. In 
that case, their information will be shared.  
In the domain of privacy on the Internet, a great deal depends on the 
default rule. If a web browser defaults people into privacy-protective 
settings, the outcomes will be very different from what they would be if 
people have to select privacy settings every time. Consider, for example, the 
current choice architecture on Google Chrome. People are allowed to select 
“Incognito,” but it is not the default, and users cannot establish it as the 
default; they are required to select it, and to “go Incognito” by choice, every 
time.49 
4. Vacation Time 
Might people’s workplace benefits, such as vacation time, depend on the 
legal default rule? To answer that question, consider a simple experiment 
that I conducted a few years ago.50 About seventy-five randomly chosen law 
students were asked to answer Question 1, and about seventy-five randomly 
chosen law students were asked to answer Question 2.51 Note that the 
answers to these two questions were in many respects quite realistic. Law 
students are very much in the position of trading off variables in the 
selection of work, and both vacation time and salary matter to their decisions. 
  
 
49  See Incognito Mode (Browse in Private), GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/chrome/ 
answer/95464?hl=en (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (explaining what Incognito mode is and how to use it). 
50 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 113-14. 
51 Id. at 113. 
Sunstein_LRO.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  12/12/2013 2:22 PM 
2013] Deciding by Default 15 
 
Question 1:  
 Imagine that you have accepted a job with a law firm in a large city. 
Your salary will be $120,000. Under state law, all companies must provide 
non-managerial employees, including associates at law firms, with a mini-
mum of two weeks in vacation time each year. 
 Suppose that the firm that you have chosen tells us that it will allow you 
to have two extra weeks of vacation, but at a somewhat reduced salary. 
What is the most that you would be willing to pay, in reduced salary, to 
obtain those two extra weeks of vacation time? (Assume that no adverse 
consequences could possibly come to you from bargaining for that extra 
vacation time.)52 
Question 2: 
Imagine that you have accepted a job with a law firm in a large city. 
Your salary will be $120,000. Under state law, all companies must provide 
non-managerial employees, including associates at law firms, with a non-
waivable minimum of two weeks in vacation time each year. State law also 
provides that all companies must provide non-managerial employees, in-
cluding associates at law firms, with a waivable extra two weeks in vacation 
time each year. The extra two weeks can be waived only as a result of “ex-
plicit, non-coerced agreements” between the parties. 
Suppose that the firm that you have chosen would be willing to pay you 
a certain amount, in extra salary, to get you to waive your right to the two 
extra weeks in vacation time. What is the least that the firm would have to 
pay you, in extra salary, to give up those two extra weeks? (Assume that no 
adverse consequences could possibly come to you from your refusal to 
waive, or from your demanding a high amount to waive.)53 
The results were dramatic. If the legal default rule includes more vaca-
tion time, people will demand a great deal to give it up; if the legal default 
rule does not include more vacation time, people will not pay a great deal to 
“buy” it. More specifically, the median willingness to pay (Question 1) was 
$6000, whereas the median willingness to accept (Question 2) was $13,000.54  
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (emphasis added). 
54 Id. 
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5. Taxis and Default Tips 
In a number of cities, taxi cabs have installed a credit card touchscreen,55 
which suggests three possible tips by making them visible and easily 
available for customers to select with a quick “touch.” In New York City, for 
rides of more than $15, the suggested amounts are usually 20%, 25%, or 
30%.56 People are free to give a larger tip, a smaller tip, or no tip at all, but it 
is easiest just to touch one of the three conspicuous options. 
The touchscreen makes everything simpler, but it also operates as a kind 
of default. To be sure, it is not precisely that, because it does not establish 
what happens if people do nothing. Any tip requires some kind of effort. 
But the touchscreen does, in a sense, establish default tips. To depart from 
them, customers have to do at least a little bit of extra work, and for that 
reason it might be expected that the defaults will affect the tips that drivers 
receive. Do they? 
Kareem Haggag and Giovanni Paci compiled data on more than 13 mil-
lion New York taxi rides.57 To test the effect of the defaults, they examined 
data from two companies that were contracted to provide credit card 
machines to New York City taxis.58 One company provided somewhat lower 
defaults of 15%, 20% and 25%.59 Do people tip less when presented with 
these lower defaults? The other company, with the higher defaults, provided 
lower default percentages for fares less than $15. Do those lower percentages 
reduce tips? 
The main finding is that the higher default tips led to significant in-
creases—by an average of more than 10%.60 If a driver makes $6000 in tips 
in a year, the higher defaults lead to a $600 raise (and the taxi industry as 
a whole will receive many millions of dollars of additional revenue annually). 
Notably, the relatively high defaults also have an unintended side effect: 
They produce a 1.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of a tip of 
 
55 See, e.g., Benjamin R. Freed, Credit Card Readers Are Actually Being Installed in D.C. Taxis, 
DCIST ( July 3, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://dcist.com/2013/07/credit_card_readers_are_actually_be. 
php (discussing the gradual introduction of these screens in the nation’s capital). 
56 See Michael M. Grynbaum, City’s Cabbies Like Plastic. Who Knew? N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2009, at A1 (discussing how credit cards have been good for business); Alex Tabarrok, Taxi Tip 
Nudge, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Dec. 6, 2012), http://marginalrevolution.com/ 
marginalrevolution/2012/12/taxi-tip-nudge.html (discussing the taxi tip nudge and providing an 
example of a credit card touchscreen). 
57 Kareen Haggag & Giovanni Paci, Default Tips 2 (Columbia Dep’t of Econ. Discussion 
Paper Series, Paper No. 1213-1, 2013), available at http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ 
ac:157853. 
58 Id. at 6. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 Id. 
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zero.61 That backlash effect is not huge, and drivers are still significantly 
ahead on balance. But it is reasonable to speculate that higher default tips 
would increase the probability of zero tips, and that speculation, along with 
the backlash finding, are suggestive about when a default will not prove 
sticky. Nonetheless, the central finding is clear, and it is that default tips 
have a significant impact. 
B. Explanations 
A great deal of research explores exactly why default rules have such a 
large effect on outcomes.62 There appear to be three principal contributing 
factors.  
1. Inertia 
The first involves inertia and procrastination (sometimes described as 
“effort” or an “effort tax”63). To change the default rule, people must make 
an active choice to reject that rule. They have to focus on and answer the 
relevant question—whether they should be enrolled in a savings plan, or 
whether they should have green energy, or whether they would gain or lose 
from a privacy policy, or whether they should give a particular tip. Especial-
ly (but not only) if the question is difficult or technical, it is tempting to 
defer the decision or not to make it at all. In view of the power of inertia 
and the tendency to procrastinate, people may simply continue with the 
status quo. 
Consider in this regard a study of television viewing, where inertia ex-
erts a powerful force.64 As programs become more popular, the programs 
that follow them also become more popular simply because the current 
 
61 Id. at 24. 
62 See, e.g., Gabriel D. Carroll et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q.J. ECON. 
1639, 1641-43 (2009) (studying the effect on outcomes when a firm switched to an auto-enrollment 
401(k) plan); William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry & Spencer Walters, Retirement Savings for Middle- and 
Lower-Income Households: The Pension Protection Act of 2006 and the Unfinished Agenda (exploring 
the effects of default rules on 401(k) plans), in AUTOMATIC 11, 13-14 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 
2009); Isaac M. Dinner et al., Partitioning Default Effects: Why People Choose Not to Choose 3 (Nov. 
28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=1352488 (examining 
“no-action” defaults). 
63 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 420-21 (noting that defaults can increase the 
difficulty of opting in to a nonmajority option); see also Jeffrey R. Brown et al., The Downside of 
Defaults 20-21 (Sept. 16, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
programs/ag/rrc/NB1101%20Brown,%20Farrell,%20Weisbenner%20FINAL.pdf (citing procrasti-
nation as one reason for default). 
64 Constança Esteves-Sorenson & Fabrizio Perretti, Micro-Costs: Inertia in Television Viewing, 
122 ECON. J. 867, 868 (2012). 
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channel is the default. More particularly, a ten percent increase in the 
popularity of the preceding program leads to a remarkable two to four 
percent increase in the audience for the following program.65 A striking 
finding is that stations exploit this behavior when scheduling their 
programs—and if they did not, they would lose up to forty percent of their 
profits.66 
For television programs, of course, viewers simply need to push a button 
to switch the channel, and channel-switching is the furthest thing from 
difficult. Opting in or opting out of default rules might be equally easy, but 
in many cases, it involves some thinking and some risk. The default rule 
might stick simply because people do not want to engage in that thinking 
and take that risk. And even if they want to do so, they might decide that 
they will do so tomorrow—and tomorrow never comes. 
Are there neurological markers of the effects of defaults? A study of the 
brain, using fMRI scanning, confirms the suggestion that default settings 
are especially important in complex situations.67 In this study, participants 
acted as line judges in a tennis match.68 An established default, provided to 
participants, suggested whether the ball was in or out, but the participants 
could override the default.69 As the decision became harder—because the 
call was closer—people became more likely not to alter the default.70 The 
striking finding is that the regions of the brain associated with more difficult 
decisions (the inferior frontal cortex) were more active when people rejected 
the default.71 This finding has general implications. It suggests that default 
rules are more likely to stick when the underlying decision is hard—and 
hence that opt out is less likely to be a useful safeguard in such circumstances. 
Consistent with this suggestion, complexity has sometimes been treated as 
an independent reason for the power of defaults,72 though it might be more 
properly treated as an amplifier of inertia, or an increase in the “effort tax.” 
I will return to this point. 
 
65 Id. at 869. 
66 Id. at 900. 
67 Stephen M. Fleming et al., Overcoming Status Quo Bias in the Human Brain, 107 PROC. 




71 Id. at 6007. 
72 See John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving Outcomes: 
Evidence from the USA (arguing that lower participation in opt-in savings plans is a result of the 
complexity of making an optimal savings plan decision), in LESSONS FROM PENSION REFORMS 
IN THE AMERICAS 59, 74-75 (Stephen Kay & Tapen Sinha eds. 2008). 
Sunstein_LRO.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  12/12/2013 2:22 PM 
2013] Deciding by Default 19 
 
We might want to make a distinction here between two kinds of effort. 
The first is the effort involved in focusing on the problem and the default 
rule, and then on whether to change it. Even if one begins with an initial 
preference of some kind, any such effort may be at least mildly unwelcome. 
Life is short, people are busy, and there are other and more enjoyable things 
to do. The second and perhaps more interesting kind is the effort involved 
in forming a preference in the first place. People may not yet have devel-
oped a preference with respect to whether to enroll in some program or to 
start some activity. The default rule may help to construct that preference, 
but what I am now emphasizing is an independent point, which is that 
people might have to engage in some real work in order to decide what their 
preferences are. Consider, for example, the question of which energy source 
to use; people may not have a preference on that count and it may take 
considerable work to form one.73  
The importance of effort, in helping defaults to stick, is demonstrated by 
evidence that when people are tired—for example, because they have made 
a large number of choices—they are more likely to stay with the default.74 
One implication is that if time is scarce, or if people have many decisions to 
make, the default will be particularly appealing because something like the 
“‘yeah, whatever’ heuristic”75 will be hard to resist.76 
With respect to the effects of inertia, consider the finding that a change 
in the default thermostat setting has a major effect on OECD employees.77 
During winter, a 1°C decrease in the default caused a significant reduction in 
the average chosen setting. The evident explanation is that because of the 
power of inertia, most employees did not bother to alter the default. This 
interpretation is supported by the noteworthy finding that when choice 
architects reduced the default setting by 2°C, the reduction in the average 
chosen setting was actually smaller, apparently because sufficient numbers 
of employees thought that it was too cold, and returned the setting to the 
 
73 See Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 4, at 1-4 (discussing the factors an individual might 
consider relevant when choosing a particular energy source). 
74 See Jonathan Levav et al., Order in Product Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field 
Experiments, 118 J. POL. ECON. 274, 277 (2010) (“‘[C]hoice overload’ can prompt people to forgo 
making a choice altogether . . . .”). 
75 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 34-35 (suggesting that the “yeah, whatever” 
heuristic is a form of the status quo bias, which is defined as a “general tendency to stick with the[] 
current situation”). 
76 See generally SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY (2013) (discuss-
ing the effects of scarcity, particularly the impact of scarcity of time on decisionmaking).  
77 See Zachary Brown et al., Testing the Effects of Defaults on the Thermostat Settings of OECD 
Employees, 39 ENERGY ECON. 128 (2013). 
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one that they preferred.78 In the face of clear discomfort, inertia is over-
come. 
2. Endorsement 
The second factor involves what people might see as an “implicit en-
dorsement” of the default rule. If choice architects have explicitly chosen 
that rule, people may believe that they have been given an implicit recom-
mendation, and that they should not depart from it unless they have private 
information that would justify a change.79 Suppose, for example, that the 
default choice is green energy, or that a public or private employer automat-
ically enrolls employees into a particular pension plan. It is tempting to 
think that experts, or sensible people, believe that these are the right 
courses of action. Those who are deciding whether to opt out might trust 
the choice architects well enough to follow their lead. Many people appear 
to think that the default was chosen by someone sensible and for a good 
reason. Especially if they lack experience or expertise, they might simply 
defer to what has been chosen for them. 
Indeed, there is strong evidence that a lack of information on the part of 
choosers, including a lack of information about alternatives, helps to account 
for the power of defaults.80 This finding suggests that default rules are less 
likely to have an effect when people consider themselves to be experienced 
or expert, and indeed there are findings to precisely this effect among 
environmental economists, who reject selected defaults in the environmental 
area.81 In another study, over half of those who stuck with the default 
specifically mentioned an absence of private information as one of their 
reasons for doing so.82 An implication of this explanation—suggestive of a 
 
78 Id. 
79 See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Partici-
pation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1182 (2001) (suggesting that employees are more 
likely to invest in a 401(k) retirement plan if the default rule is to allocate part of their income 
because “employees view the default investment allocation under automatic enrollment as implicit 
advice from the company on ‘the best’ allocation of one’s retirement assets”); Craig R.M. 
McKenzie, Michael J. Liersch & Stacey R. Finkelstein, Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 414, 418-19 (2006) (describing experiments in which policymakers’ preferences 
were reflected in the default option provided to decisionmakers, who were in turn unlikely to 
deviate from the default). Of course, it is not true that all defaults are chosen because they 
produce the best outcomes for decisionmakers. 
80 See Brown et al., supra note 63, at 3 (“[A] lack of adequate information about decision 
alternatives is a significant driver of the likelihood of default . . . .”). 
81 Åsa Löfgren et al., Are Experienced People Affected by a Pre-Set Default Option—Results From 
a Field Experiment, 63 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 66 (2012). 
82 See Brown et. al., supra note 63, at 19 (“In total, 51.3 percent of the defaulters chose at least 
one information-related problem as an explanation for their default behavior . . . .”). 
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method for testing whether inertia or instead perceived endorsement is 
making the default rule stick—is that if choosers do not trust the choice 
architect, they will be far more likely to opt out. And indeed, there is 
evidence for this proposition as well.83 
An important qualification of the “implied endorsement” explanation 
involves an apparent information asymmetry. 84  There is evidence that 
people believe that automatic enrollment conveys information about what is 
sensible or best—but that automatic nonenrollment does not.85 The evident reason 
is that people take automatic enrollment as a deliberate choice by the choice 
architects, and they believe that the choice would be made only if there was 
a good reason. By contrast, people take nonenrollment to reflect simple 
inaction, without any supporting reason, and hence not to convey infor-
mation.86 (Note that this is a plausible inference.) Apparently many people 
are willing to ask about the reason for the default rule. While people 
understood automatic enrollment to be motivated by a judgment that 
enrollment is a good idea, they think that nonenrollment may have no 
particular motivation and may instead result from a failure to make any kind 
of judgment about what is best.87 
This evidence suggests that while automatic enrollment would stick as a 
result of both inertia and endorsement, automatic nonenrollment would 
stick only for the former reason. Another implication, with experimental 
support, is that when people trust the choice architect, automatic enrollment 
will be particularly sticky, but not so much when trust is low; similar swings 
should not be seen for nonenrollment.88 
3. Reference Point and Loss Aversion 
The default rule helps to establish the “reference point” for people’s 
decisions. Consider in this regard the behavioral finding of loss aversion. 
People dislike losses far more than they like corresponding gains,89 and 
 
83 See David Tannenbaum & Peter H. Ditto, Information Asymmetries in Default Options 
11-17 (unpublished manuscript), available at https://webfiles.uci.edu/dtannenb/www/documents/ 
default%20information%20asymmetries.pdf (describing a study in university classrooms that 
found a positive correlation between students’ trust in their instructor and their decision to stick 
with a default scheme of assignment due dates). 
84 Id. at 17. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Note that viewing nonenrollment as a result of mere inaction is also a plausible inference. 
88 Tannenbaum & Ditto, supra note 83, at 4. 
89 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the En-
dowment Effect and the Coase Theorem (highlighting the phenomenon of loss aversion, where “losses 
are weighted substantially more than objectively commensurate gains”), in QUASI RATIONAL 
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whether a loss or a gain is involved does not come from nature or from the 
sky. The default rule determines what counts as a loss and what counts as a 
gain.  
To appreciate the power of loss aversion and its relationship to default 
rules, consider an ingenious study of teacher incentives.90 Many people have 
been interested in encouraging teachers to do better to improve their 
students’ achievements. The results of providing economic incentives are 
decidedly mixed; unfortunately, many of these efforts have failed.91 But the 
relevant study enlists loss aversion by resetting the default. The authors 
gave teachers money in advance and told them that if their students did not 
show real improvements, the teachers would have to give the money back.92 The 
result was a significant increase in math scores93—indeed, an increase 
equivalent to a substantial improvement in teacher quality. The underlying 
idea here is that losses from the status quo are especially unwelcome, and 
people will work hard to avoid those losses.94 
 In short, what counts as a loss depends on the reference point, which is 
established by the default rule.95 Suppose that employees are receiving 
$5000 per month in take-home salary, and that the question is whether they 
want some of that amount to be deducted for savings. If so, employees 
might decline. Who wants to lose a significant part of their take-home pay? 
But if employees are receiving $4800 per month in take-home salary and 
$200 per month is going into savings, they might not complain—and they 
 
ECONOMICS 167, 169 (Richard H. Thaler ed. 1994); A. Peter McGraw et al., Comparing Gains and 
Losses, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1438, 1443-44 (2010) (concluding that loss aversion manifests itself even 
in tasks where gains and losses are placed in the same context). Vivid evidence of loss aversion can 
be found in David Card & Gordon B. Dahl, Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected 
Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior, 126 Q.J. ECON. 103, 105-06, 130-35 (2011) (finding an increase 
in domestic violence after a favored football team suffers an upset loss). 
90 Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives Through Loss Aversion: 
A Field Experiment 2-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18237, 2012), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18237.pdf. 
91 Field experiments in the United States that have linked teacher pay to teacher perfor-
mance “have shown small, if not negative, treatment effects.” Id. at 2. 
92 Id. at 3. 
93 Id. 
94 A study that examined the District of Columbia’s small, five-cent tax on disposable grocery 
bags clearly demonstrates the powerful effect of loss aversion. That study showed that the tax has 
had a significant effect in reducing disposable grocery bag use—but that, prior to the implementa-
tion of the tax, small, five-cent bonuses that stores offered customers for using reusable bags had 
essentially no effect. Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact 
of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use 2-4 (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.pdf. 
95 See Dinner et al., supra note 62, at 6 (explaining how a decisionmaker may act as if she has 
already chosen the default option and will use it as a reference point). 
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might strongly resist the idea of taking away that $200 per month from 
savings. Who wants to lose their savings? With respect to the power of 
default rules, several of the findings described thus far are plausibly 
attributable to loss aversion. 
In many areas, loss aversion matters, and it helps to explain the effect of 
the default rule. Energy use and environmental protection are among them. 
If, for example, the default rule favors energy-efficient light bulbs, and 
people are asked whether they want less efficient bulbs, then the loss (in 
terms of reduced efficiency) may loom large and they will continue to 
purchase energy-efficient light bulbs.96 But if the default rule favors less 
efficient (and initially less expensive) light bulbs, and people are asked 
whether they want to pay more for efficient ones, then the loss (in terms of 
upfront costs) may loom large, and there will be a tendency to favor less 
efficient light bulbs. 
4. Deliberate Defaulting and Reflective Indifference 
The three factors just outlined are the major ones, but there are others.97 
In particular, choosers might actually prefer the default and stick with it 
because they do so. Alternatively, choosers might be indifferent, on reflec-
tion, among the various options, and they might stick with the default 
simply to minimize costs and burdens. This explanation is close to the first, 
but it does not involve inertia as such. In some cases, people stick with the 
default, whatever it is, because they do not think it is worthwhile to under-
take (even minimal) effort to change it. 
5. Diverse Explanations, Diverse Concerns 
The explanation for the stickiness of the default rule may be relevant to 
the decision about whether to change it. Each explanation raises its own 
concerns.98  
Suppose that people do not alter the default rule because they believe 
that choice architects have implicitly endorsed it. On the one hand, choice 
architects might consider themselves relatively free to adopt the default rule 
that they do in fact endorse. On the other hand, some prominent work 
 
96 Id. at 12-14; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 22-37 (describing a set of 
heuristics and biases). 
97 See Brown et al., supra note 63, at 18-21 (listing various reasons that may account for de-
fault behavior). 
98 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 422 (suggesting that among effort, implied en-
dorsement, and loss aversion, none is the primary cause of a default rule’s stickiness, and that “it 
seems quite possible that the strength of each differs according to context”).  
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suggests that when trusted authorities tell people to do something, they 
become more likely to do it, even if it involves cruelty and indeed torture.99 
Recent explanations of this phenomenon point to the fact that people 
believe in experts, and when trusted authorities seem to have expertise, 
people will follow them.100  
Here, then, is a serious problem: People may follow authorities who set 
default rules, in deference to their expertise, even if the rules are objectionable 
or nefarious. To be sure, choice architects are most unlikely to believe 
themselves to be nefarious, and hence they are unlikely to be moved by this 
concern. But from the social point of view, the power of authority and 
expertise will argue in favor of active choosing in circumstances in which 
the choice architects cannot be trusted.  
If the default rule sticks as a result of inertia or loss aversion, the under-
lying concern is different. There might seem to be a risk that choice archi-
tects are manipulating people or exploiting behavioral findings to produce 
their preferred outcomes.101 Even in such cases, however, we do not have an 
objection to default rules as such. Any default is likely to have an influence, 
and the question would seem to be which default rule is best. That question 
must be addressed on the merits. But at least in cases involving inadequately 
informed or untrustworthy choice architects, there is an argument on behalf 
of active choosing; I turn to that argument in due course. 
II. NONSTICKY (IMPERSONAL) DEFAULT RULES 
In some circumstances, impersonal default rules do not stick. To under-
stand the uses and limits of this particular kind of nudge, and to see why 
active choosing and personalized defaults might be better, we need to 
specify those circumstances. 
 
99 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 1-
12 (1974) (describing an experiment in which participants obeyed instructions to administer 
electric shocks to actors who were pretending to be volunteers in another room despite orders to 
increase the number of volts administered). 
100 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 32-37 (2003) (summarizing 
the Milgram experiment and exploring it as a prominent example of individuals blindly following 
expertise). 
101 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 136-39 
(2006) (offering examples of how individuals’ beliefs and opinions can be manipulated); Joshua D. 
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and 
Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1049 & n.71 (2012) (citing literature studying 
how companies exploit cognitive biases). 
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A. Clear Preferences and Extreme Defaults 
Consider the question of marital names.102 When people marry, all states 
in the United States have the same default rule: Both men and women 
retain their premarriage surnames. But there is nothing inevitable about the 
current default rule. We could easily imagine a large number of alternatives. 
For example: 
 The husband’s surname stays the same and the wife’s surname changes 
to that of her husband. Indeed, that approach, however discriminatory 
(and almost certainly unconstitutional), would mimic people’s actual 
choices, at least in the United States.  
 The husband’s surname changes to that of his wife, and the wife’s name 
stays the same.  
 The spouses’ surnames are hyphenated.  
 The spouses’ surnames are changed to Skywalker, or Longstocking, or 
Obama, or Gaga, or Potatohead. 
What are the effects of the current rule? In the overwhelming majority 
of cases, American men do stick with the default. Relatively few men 
change their names. By contrast, the overwhelming majority of American 
women do so—for college graduates, eighty percent.103 In that respect, the 
default rule seems to have relatively little impact on women. To be sure, it is 
quite possible that the percentage of women who change their names would 
be even higher if they were defaulted into doing so. Nonetheless, it is 
revealing that most married women reject the default. 
Why doesn’t the default rule stick for women? Three factors seem to be 
important. First, many women (undoubtedly affected by social norms, 
which some women may wish to be otherwise) affirmatively want to change 
their names, and their desire is not unclear.104 This is not a complex or un-
familiar area in which people have vague or ambiguous all-things-considered 
 
102 For a full discussion of defaults in the context of marital names, see generally Elizabeth F. 
Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 761 (2007). 
103 Id. at 786. 
104 To be sure, the full picture here is unclear, and the word “want” elides some important 
issues. In many cases, social norms (whether or not women or men approve of them) exert a 
degree of pressure, and some husbands undoubtedly make their own preferences clear. These 
factors can affect the choices of wives. Social norms can operate as the equivalent of a default rule 
and overcome the legal default. It is possible that this account is, for many wives, the underlying 
story here. 
  
26 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1 
 
preferences. The social norm may establish a kind of default that over-
whelms the effect of the legal default rule. Second, the issue is highly salient 
to married women, and because marriage is a defined and defining event, 
the timing of the required action is relatively clear as a social matter at least. 
Procrastination and inertia are therefore less important; the effort tax is 
worth incurring. Third, the change of name is, for some or many of those 
who do it, a kind of celebration. It is not the sort of activity that people seek 
to defer. If people affirmatively like to choose, a supposed effort tax is 
nothing of the sort; it may even be a kind of effort subsidy.105 (There is a 
lesson here about when choosing is a benefit rather than a burden.) When 
the relevant conditions are met—clear preferences, clear timing, and 
positive feelings about opt-in—the default rule is unlikely to matter 
much.106 
Indeed, clear preferences are likely to be sufficient to ensure that the 
default rule will not stick. Recall that preferences may be constructed by 
default rules, rather than antedating them.107 If preferences are clear, inertia 
will be overcome; people will not be much moved by any endorsement 
taken to be reflected in the default rule;108 and loss aversion will be far less 
relevant, in part because the clear preference helps define the reference 
point from which losses are measured. Suppose that employees are automat-
ically enrolled into a plan that puts eighty percent of their income into 
savings, or sixty percent of their income into their nation’s treasury (after 
taxes!), or twenty percent of their income into their worst enemy’s savings 
account,109 or ten percent of their income into the toilet. Most employees in 
such plans will undoubtedly opt out.  
A study in the United Kingdom found that most people opted out of a 
savings plan, admittedly less horrible than those just described, but with an 
unusually high default contribution rate (twelve percent of pretax income).110 
Only about twenty-five percent of employees remained at that rate after a 
year, whereas about sixty percent of employees shifted to a lower default 
 
105 In certain circumstances, of course, making a choice may serve as a benefit rather than a 
burden. 
106 Elizabeth Emens has offered a number of suggestions in the context of marital names. 
Emens, supra note 102, at 829-36. 
107 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 425.  
108 Though the general point holds, in the context of marital names the issue may be more 
complex, especially in light of the evident power of social norms. Emens, supra note 102, at 839. 
109 On using strategies of this sort as precommitment devices, see generally IAN AYRES, 
CARROTS AND STICKS (2010). 
110 John Beshears et al., The Limitations of Defaults (Sept. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.nber.org/programs/ag/rrc/NB10-02,%20Beshears,%20Choi,%20Laibson,%20 
Madrian.pdf. 
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contribution rate.111 Notably, people with lower incomes were more likely to 
stay at the unusually high contribution rate.112 Similar findings have been 
made elsewhere, with growing evidence that those who are less educated or 
less sophisticated are more likely to stick with the default.113 
A clear implication is that “extreme” defaults are less likely to stick. A 
more puzzling implication, based on the lower incomes of those who stayed 
with the default in the study just described, is that default rules may be 
more sticky for low-income workers than for their higher-earning counter-
parts. One reason may be that low-income workers have a great deal to 
worry about,114 and so are less likely to take the trouble to think through and 
to alter the default rule. An effort tax may seem especially high to, and have 
an especially large adverse effect on, people who are already facing a large 
number of decisions and costs. Another reason may be that low-income 
workers have less confidence in their own judgments, and so they allow the 
default allocation to stick.  
Indeed, there is general evidence that when people are experienced, and 
hence know what they want, they are far less likely to be affected by the 
default rule.115 One reason is that the effort tax is worth incurring.116 The 
fact that low-income workers have been found not to opt out has important 
implications for the uses and limits of default rules. Among other things, it 
suggests a potential danger in both impersonal and personalized defaults, 
which may prove harmful and be likely to stick. Distributional considera-
tions, and in particular adverse effects on poor people, may raise particular 
problems for certain default rules, at least if they are not in the interest of a 
number of people to whom they apply—a point to which I will return. 
There are other situations in which the default rule does not have a large 
impact. Workers are not so much affected if a significant fraction of their tax 
 
111 Id. at 8. 
112 Id. at 10-11. 
113 Brown et al., supra note 63, at 3. 
114 See BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 33, at 64-68 (explaining that people, especially the 
poor, postpone small costs necessary for long-term rewards in exchange for small rewards in the 
present); see also Shah et al., supra note 32, at 682-83 (describing some effects of attention neglect 
on low-income individuals); cf. Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: 
Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2013, at 302, 331 
(finding that low-income people pay more particular attention to taxes at the register than 
wealthier people). For a discussion of the effects of scarcity in depleting psychological resources of 
poor people, see generally MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 76. 
115 See Löfgren et al., supra note 81, at 68-69 (2012) (finding “no significant effect of default 
options in [the] experienced sample”). 
116 Note, however, that poor people are uniquely attentive to sales taxes levied at the register. 
Goldin & Homonoff, supra note 114, at 331. This finding suggests the possibility that in some 
domains, poor people may be especially attentive and hence more likely to opt out. 
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refund is defaulted into U.S. savings bonds. In large numbers, they opt out, 
apparently because they have definite plans to spend their refunds and do 
not have much interest in putting their tax refunds into savings.117 The 
central finding—that default rules will have a weaker effect, and potentially 
no effect, when people have a strong antecedent preference for a certain 
outcome—is both a warning and an opportunity. It is a warning because it 
suggests that the default rule may not have the hoped-for effect. It is an 
opportunity because it suggests that the ability to opt out can be an im-
portant safeguard against defaults that are unhelpful or affirmatively 
harmful. 
For choosers, relevant considerations include knowledge of alternatives 
and trust in the choice architect. If choosers know about approaches that 
differ from those in the default, they may well consider whether to select 
those options. And if choosers think that the choice architects are not 
trustworthy, they will not be much influenced by them (though inertia may 
still have a powerful effect). Indeed, there is good evidence that people will 
switch if they do not trust choice architects; in particular, a number of 
people reject automatic enrollment for that reason.118 And if people do not 
have preexisting preferences—if their preferences are effectively constructed 
by the choice architect—then they are highly likely to stick with the default.119 
B. Prompting Opt-Out 
In some situations, defaults may not stick even though they are im-
portant safeguards. Suppose that self-interested people have a strong 
incentive to promote opt-out. If so, they might be able to take steps to 
achieve their goals. If green energy is far less profitable than more conven-
tional energy sources, we can be confident that those who sell conventional 
energy will take aggressive steps to encourage people to opt out of any 
default rule in favor of green energy. Especially if those steps are not only 
aggressive but also behaviorally informed, they might well succeed; they 
might, for example, enlist loss aversion to encourage opt-out. Here, then, is 
 
117 See Erin Todd Bronchetti et al., When a Nudge Isn’t Enough: Defaults and Saving Among 
Low-Income Tax Filers 28-29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16887, 2011), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16887 (explaining that default manipulation did not have 
an impact on tax refund allocation to a savings bond where an individual previously intended to 
spend the refund). Note, however, that the “default” in this study consisted of a mere statement on 
a form with the option to opt out. Id. at 17-18. In such a case, the line between the use of such a 
“default” and active choosing is relatively thin. 
118 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
119 I am grateful to Eric Johnson for pressing this point. 
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an important safeguard against ill-chosen defaults but also a serious obstacle 
to public-interested efforts to use defaults to produce desirable social change. 
The problem of such an obstacle is not hypothetical. Consider the regu-
latory effort in 2010 by the Federal Reserve Board to protect consumers 
from bank overdraft fees.120 The regulation forbids banks from charging a 
fee for overdrafts from checking accounts unless the accountholder has 
explicitly enrolled in the bank’s overdraft program.121 One of the goals of 
the nonenrollment default rule is to protect customers, and especially low-
income customers, from ending up taking the equivalent of extraordinarily 
high interest loans—indeed, loans with interest rates of up to 7000%.122 In 
principle, the regulation should have had a large effect, and an understand-
ing of the power of default rules helped to motivate promulgation of that 
regulation. But the available evidence suggests that the effect may well be 
modest because people are opting into the program, and thus rejecting the 
nonenrollment default, in large numbers.  
What explains this modest effect? As Lauren Willis shows in an im-
portant and illuminating article,123 a central reason is that banks much 
dislike the regulation, want to be able to charge overdraft fees, and hence 
use a number of tools to facilitate opt-out. They have taken steps to make 
opt-out as easy as possible—for example, simply by pushing a button on an 
ATM.124 They have also engaged in active marketing and created economic 
incentives to persuade people to opt out.125 Showing an implicit (or perhaps 
even explicit) understanding of behavioral economics, they exploit loss 
aversion and consumer confusion to encourage account holders to think that 
they will lose money if they do not opt out.126 Consider the following 
excerpt from one bank’s marketing materials, explicitly enlisting loss 
aversion: 
Yes: Keep my account working the same with Shareplus ATM and 
debit card overdraft coverage. 
No: Change my account to remove Shareplus ATM and debit card 
overdraft coverage.127 
 
120 Requirements for Overdraft Services, 45 § C.F.R. 205.17 (2010).  
121 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1174-75 
(explaining the regulation). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1186-87. 
124 Id. at 1187. 
125 Id. at 1188. 
126 Id. at 1189-91. 
127 Id. at 1192. 
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As one bank employee explained, “People are scared of change so they’ll 
opt in [to overdraft] to avoid change.”128 There is a large contrast here with 
the retirement context, where providers enthusiastically endorse automatic 
enrollment.129 The general lesson is that if regulated institutions are strongly 
opposed to the default rule and have easy access to their customers, they 
may well be able to use a variety of strategies, including behavioral ones, to 
encourage people to move in their preferred directions. In some circum-
stances, it may be necessary to take further steps to make the default rule 
sticky, if ensuring that it sticks is indeed the goal. 
III. A PUZZLE FOR CHOICE ARCHITECTS: 
WHICH DEFAULT RULE? 
We have seen enough to know that in many domains, choice architects 
can achieve desirable goals—and do so while maintaining freedom of choice 
and at low cost—by selecting good default rules and by avoiding harmful 
ones. But which default rule should choice architects select?130 How do we 
know which is good and which is harmful? My narrow focus in this section 
is on choice architects who work for the public sector, in the capacity of 
regulators or judges. Selection of default rules by the private sector raises 
different questions, though some of the suggestions here bear on the choice 
of such rules by nongovernmental actors as well.131 
 
128 Id. 
129 See, e.g., Automatic Enrollment, NATIONWIDE, http://www.nationwide.com/automatic-
enrollment.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (noting that “the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made 
provisions for companies to automatically enroll [their] employees in[to] defined-contribution 
[retirement] plans”); see also Willis, supra note 121 (discussing the potential ineffectiveness of 
defaults).  
130 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 83-100 (discussing various factors that choice 
architects should consider when crafting defaults). 
131 In a well-functioning market, competitive pressures should lead to optimal default rules if 
choice architects are attempting to maximize profits. If companies select default rules that harm 
consumers, they should soon find themselves with fewer consumers. Under optimistic assumptions, 
the profit motive should therefore be sufficient to produce good default rules; armed with an 
understanding of when and why default rules stick, companies should act consistently with that 
motive. On the other hand, competitive pressures may, under plausible assumptions, lead to harmful 
rather than helpful default rules, at least in certain markets. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY 
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 6-8 (2012) 
(exploring behavior market failures). In addition, some companies pursue social welfare goals that 
do not involve maximizing profits, which may bear on their selection of default rules. Cf. Aneel 
Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703338004575230112664504890.html (arguing that 
companies only pursue social welfare goals where this pursuit maximizes profits). 
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A. The Informed-Chooser Default 
If default rules are to be chosen by reference to the most basic social 
commitments, we could imagine a number of possible answers.132 Some 
people might think that the best approach promotes economic efficiency. 
Others might believe that we should choose default rules that are most fair 
or just. Still others might believe that choice architects should decide which 
rules would maximize social welfare and choose accordingly.133  
1. The Central Idea 
Begin with the standard case in which there are no (or modest) third-
party effects. I propose that we might bracket the deepest questions and 
obtain an “incompletely theorized agreement” on a preferred approach—
that is, an agreement that can attract support from people with diverse 
foundational commitments, and from those who are not sure about which 
commitments they believe to be foundational.134 The preferred approach is 
to select the default rule that reflects what most people would choose if they were 
adequately informed.135 Call this the “informed-chooser default.” The ad-
vantage of this approach is that it should simultaneously appeal, at least in 
general, to those who focus on efficiency, welfare, autonomy, or fairness.136 
If we know that a particular default rule would place people in the situation 
that informed people would bargain their way to or select, we have good 
reason to select that default rule (with the understanding that those who 
differ from the majority may opt out).  
 
132 See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1-11 (2012) (introducing social welfare functions (SWFs) and arguing 
that the SWF approach should be used to morally evaluate governmental or other large-scale 
choices). 
133 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 109 (describing the effect of a default rule on workers’ 
welfare as a “key question” in evaluating a default rule); see also ADLER, supra note 132, at 22-32 
(discussing the philosophical issues with ranking and structuring outcomes). 
134 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35 (1996) 
(exploring incompletely theorized agreements as a way to achieve consensus on outcomes amidst 
theoretical divisions). 
135 See N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive Helpers 15-16 
(INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009), available at https://flora.insead.edu/ 
fichiersti_wp/inseadwp2009/2009-03.pdf (noting that the greatest number benefit when the 
“default is set to the preference most people would make when faced with making an active 
choice”). 
136 To be sure, there are some complications. People who are concerned with fairness or 
distribution may fear that the bargaining power of one side will cause informed people to settle on 
an unfair agreement, and that a different default rule might be better. For present purposes, I put 
that point to one side. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Sunstein, supra note 42, at 119-
22. 
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Suppose that we know that eighty percent of people, given a great deal 
of information, would choose green energy. That is a strong reason to favor 
automatic enrollment in green energy. One reason is that if informed 
people would select a particular option, defaulting people into that option is 
respectful of their autonomy. Another reason is that the informed-chooser 
default is likely to promote people’s welfare. It is also easy to defend on 
grounds of both efficiency and fairness. 
2. Doubts 
To be sure, the idea of an informed-chooser default raises many ques-
tions. First, choice architects may not have enough information to know 
what approach informed people would choose. It might well be necessary 
for them to do a great deal of empirical work in order to identify that 
approach. As we shall see, this is a point in favor of active choosing. If 
choice architects lack the knowledge that would enable them to select the 
appropriate default, they might want to ask people instead. 
Second, and apart from the empirical challenge, the idea of “informed” 
choice will sometimes raise hard normative and conceptual problems. As 
behavioral economists have stressed, people may blunder even if they are 
well informed.137 They may, for example, display unrealistic optimism or 
discount the long term. 138  Their judgments about probability may go 
wrong.139 Perhaps those who make such errors can be counted as unin-
formed, but this claim is a bit of a cheat; people may err even if they have 
all relevant information. If informed people are subject to biases, choice 
architects may not want to base default rules on their choices.  
At the same time, there is a serious risk in any effort to develop the idea 
of an informed chooser by attempting to correct such biases. The risk is that 
choice architects will not really be deciding what choosers want, but instead 
relying on what they believe to be right—in which case the choosers, as 
agents, do not seem particularly important. To avoid that risk, choice 
architects should probably rely on what informed choosers actually do, while 
acknowledging that if their choices can really be shown to be opposed to 
their interests (perhaps because of a behavioral bias), then it might make 
sense to depart from those choices. 
 
137 See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1830-31.  
138 Id. at 1831 (describing the frequently incorrect predictions that people make regarding 
future benefits). 
139 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 33 (noting that pervasive optimism may 
prevent people from taking “sensible preventive steps”). 
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It is also important to emphasize that in a setting that involves bargaining 
and negotiation, it may be especially difficult to know what informed people 
would choose, and a default rule that seems to favor one side may not be the 
provision to which informed people would bargain. For example, informed 
workers and informed employers may not bargain their way toward a “good 
cause” provision for the termination of employment if the consequence of 
that provision would be to impose high costs on employers (and eventually 
on employees) without providing important or meaningful safeguards for 
workers. Informed customers and energy companies may refuse to bargain 
their way to a particular “green” default if it turns out to impose much 
higher costs.140 (Of course, the existence of third party effects, taken up 
below, may argue in favor of green defaults.141) 
On all of these counts, actual evidence—about what informed choosers 
do—is extremely important. It would be useful to assemble information 
about the level of opt-out under various alternatives. 142  And indeed, 
selection of a default rule might well be preceded by a period of active 
choosing as a way of assembling that information. Perhaps experiments or 
pilot programs would provide such information. If only two percent of 
people opt out under A, and fifty percent opt out under B, we have reason 
to believe that A is better. 
Of course, it is possible that majority rule is too crude. Suppose that 
there are two default rules, A and B. Suppose that fifty-five percent of 
informed people would be relatively indifferent between A and B, but would 
slightly prefer A. Suppose too that because of their unusual situation, forty-
five percent of people would strongly prefer B. We should probably select B 
because almost half of the population would very much like it and the 
(narrow) majority would care only a little bit. The example shows that it is 
important to ask not only about which approach would be preferred by 
informed people, but also about the intensity of their preferences.  
3. Intensity and Opt-Out 
To be sure, there is a wrinkle here. If people have intense preferences, 
they are more likely to opt out, and hence we might not want those with 
intense preferences to have a large role in setting the default rule—because, 
for them, that rule will not stick in any case. As we have seen, clear and 
 
140 Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 4, at 17-18 (noting that consumers tend to choose less ex-
pensive green energy options). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 16-17 (raising the possibility of “experiments or pilot programs” to collect such 
information). 
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intense contrary preferences are the essential reason that default rules do 
not stick—and for those with weak preferences, such rules will stick even if 
they would not prefer it. For this reason, it would be possible to suggest that 
we should simply use majority rule, even or perhaps especially in the face of 
strong contrary preferences. But this suggestion raises a further question, 
which is whether in the particular context, we really do have reason for 
confidence that those with strong preferences will switch. They may not do 
so if for them, inertia is a powerful force, or if any kind of effort tax proves 
decisive, or if their otherwise strong preferences are affected by the sugges-
tion implicit in the default rule. 
The most natural way to think of the choice is in terms of costs and bene-
fits.143 If a default rule turned out to stick, what would be the costs and what 
would be the benefits?144 In the example just given, there is a good argu-
ment that default rule B would be best. We could easily imagine cases in 
which the choice architect would seek “tailored” default rules, suitable to 
particular people and settings, in a way that greatly overlaps with the idea of 
personalized defaults.145 We could easily imagine cases in which the choice 
among possible default rules is hard, and in such cases, active choosing 
might be better; I will return to this point.146 
Note, however, that the question of marital names suggests an interesting 
qualification to the idea that the default rule should track the choices of 
informed people. Taken seriously, that idea would suggest that states should 
presume that men want to keep their premarital surnames and that women 
want to change their surnames to those of their husbands. But a default rule 
of this kind would be discriminatory, and it would almost certainly be found 
unconstitutional.147 The example shows that in some settings, informed 
choices lack authority if they run afoul of important social commitments, at 
least if government proposes to use those choices as a basis for policy.148 
 
143 See, e.g., Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 5, at 1339 (discussing the tradeoff between the 
benefit of saving lives and the potential physical, cognitive, and emotional costs imposed on those 
opting out of various organ donation default rules). 
144 Distributional issues may of course matter as well. See ADLER, supra note 132, at 108 
(discussing the use of distributive weights in governmental decision procedures); Sunstein, supra 
note 42, at 126-27 (discussing potential distributional gains from different default rules). 
145 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 22, at 91-92 (discussing the difference between tailored 
and untailored default rules).  
146 See infra Section VI.B. 
147 Cf. Emens, supra note 102, at 834-36 (discussing how setting legal defaults for marital 
name changes that are different for men and for women raises constitutional problems). 
148 The domain of marital names overlaps in this regard with that of racially based adoption 
policies. See R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences 
Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875, 877-82 (1998) (discussing deeply divided 
views over “race matching” in adoptions). 
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B. Penalty Defaults 
If choice architects do not know which rule would be chosen by informed 
people, standard contract theory suggests that they might favor a “penalty 
default,” designed to elicit that information.149 Under this approach, the law 
(or some other actor) would place the burden of change on the party who is 
most likely to seek change, if change is desirable. Instead of tracking 
people’s informed choices, this approach attempts to figure out what those 
choices are, by using a default rule that penalizes people who do not reveal 
those choices. 
For example, employees sometimes lack information about their legal 
rights, showing unrealistic optimism.150 A default rule that gives certain 
rights to employees might increase the flow of information between the 
parties and to the legal system.151 Suppose that if the default rule confers 
certain rights on employees—say, to job security—employers will want to 
“buy” those rights. If this is the case, we will see a system in which certain 
information is disclosed to employees, simply as part of the process by 
which employers bargain. A default rule that protects workers might give 
them important information when they would otherwise overestimate their 
legal rights.  
If there are third-party effects, of course the assessment of default rules 
will be affected. The issue is no longer limited to the welfare of choosers. 
Suppose that under default rule A, significant costs are imposed on third 
parties, but that under default rule B, those costs are avoided. If so, B is 
clearly preferable. In the case of default rules for organ donations and 
energy, this possibility is not hypothetical. A default rule in favor of organ 
donation would of course produce significant benefits for third parties; the 
reason for such a default is not to protect choosers, but to protect those who 
would benefit from an increase in the number of available organs.152 In 
addition, we could easily imagine energy choices that would impose lower 
 
149 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 22, at 91-95 (explaining that penalty defaults reveal 
information because they are purposefully set at what parties do not want, and providing ways to 
analyze the efficiency of penalty defaults). 
150 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 118-22 (1999) 
(finding, in a survey of individuals in the work force, that these individuals frequently overstated 
the protections available in the workplace). 
151 See Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 1792-94 (arguing for penalty default rules that would 
increase information sharing). 
152 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 177-84 (highlighting the influence of default 
rules on organ donation rates, but suggesting that mandated active choosing would be more 
appropriate given the sensitivity of the matter). 
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environmental and other costs; green defaults might be justifiable on that 
ground.  
In such cases, there is a strong argument for preferring the default rule 
that reduces those costs. The selection of the default rule should be based 
on an analysis of all relevant benefits and costs (capaciously understood), 
and choice architects should select the approach that maximizes net benefits 
(understood to include the range of ingredients in social welfare). And if 
third-party effects are large, we might not be in the domain of mere default 
rules. If a particular approach prevents the imposition of serious costs on 
third parties, then there is a strong argument that it should be a mandate, 
not subject to opt-out. But we could imagine cases in which the existence 
and magnitude of third-party effects is disputed, and in such (admittedly 
unusual) cases, the best approach might be a default rule that prevents such 
effects. 
As in the case of informed-chooser defaults, net-benefits defaults may 
not be easy to identify. In the case of energy providers, for example, choice 
architects might have to consider not only the costs of service, but also 
environmental costs, perhaps including the costs of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, which would require assessment of the social cost of carbon.153 The 
overall assessment may present formidable challenges. Unlike in cases where 
the question is the welfare of choosers, moreover, active choosing would not 
be a way out of the dilemma because it would likely result in disregard of 
the interests of third parties.154 
IV. BAD DEFAULTS 
Default rules can of course be badly chosen or misused by private and 
public institutions alike. In fact some such rules can be extremely harmful. 
Imagine, for example, a voting system that says that if you do nothing, your 
vote will be registered as favoring the incumbent—but that you can opt out 
if you like. Or imagine a nation that defaults you into a certain political 
party or religion—but that allows you to opt out. Or a rental car company 
that defaults you into all sorts of insurance policies and payment plans that 
are essentially a waste of money—but that allows you to opt out. 
Fortunately, market forces constrain at least some of the most harmful 
default rules. Competitive markets impose real limits on bad defaults. 
 
153 See, e.g., Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 4, at 18 (acknowledging potentially serious empiri-
cal challenges in identifying an appropriate default rule in the environmental context). 
154 Id. at 17-18 (discussing the impact of externalities on choice architecture and arguing that 
mandates are appropriate in cases of significant negative externalities). 
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Before long, customers are not likely to go to companies that choose a series 
of such defaults. For this reason, many companies choose default rules that 
are helpful rather than harmful; for example, the default settings for 
computers and cell phones are generally in the interest of customers. In 
some cases, however, companies may have an incentive to promote unhelpful 
defaults, especially when they are dealing with fine print and when the 
relevant attributes of the product are shrouded and not salient.155 In credit 
markets, providers may be helped, not punished, if they exploit behavioral 
biases such as unrealistic optimism; providers who do not exploit those 
biases may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage.156 Serious problems 
may also arise when there are information asymmetries, or when choice 
architects can help construct preferences. For example, a company may 
know what it wants, and consumers may not know what they want, and 
hence there may be opportunities for deals that are bad from the standpoint 
of consumers. 
Consider in this regard the practice of “negative option marketing.” This 
practice occurs when people who accept a “free” product are automatically 
enrolled in a plan or program that carries a monthly fee (unless they 
explicitly opt out).157 Customers might, for example, receive a hotel room 
for free, but as a result they might be enrolled in a program that charges 
them fifteen dollars per month. The monthly charge might be mentioned 
quietly and obscurely, if at all, and if it is mentioned, people might be given 
(quietly) the option to opt out.158 In some cases, negative option marketing 
has a most unfortunate effect, which is that it uses a default rule to exploit 
the tendency toward inertia in a way that can cost people a great deal of 
money. Customers might not see the monthly bill, or if they see it, they 
might assume that all is well, and they might not cancel the plan until they 
have (automatically) paid a great deal. In this case, inertia, and apparently a 
 
155 See BAR-GILL, supra note 131, at 91-94 (discussing how credit card issuers design complex, 
multidimensional contracts to exploit consumers’ lower sensitivity to less salient features such as 
long-term prices). 
156 Id. at 95 (noting that credit card issuers worked to find new, less salient price dimensions 
as consumers became more aware of annual fees and interest rates in the 1990s). 
157 See 16 C.F.R. § 425.1 (2012) (regulating the use of prenotification negative-option 
plans); FTC, NEGATIVE OPTIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02 
/P064202negativeoptionreport.pdf (describing four types of plans that could be classified as 
negative-option marketing). 
158 I received a little lesson about this problem when my credit card company graciously 
offered to provide me with a free three-month subscription to several magazines of my choice. As 
a result, I found myself subscribing to those magazines, even though I didn’t like them. But many 
years after the three-month period, I was automatically subscribing for full price. It was not until I 
faced the prospect of government employment, and the resulting salary cut, that I cancelled my 
subscriptions. 
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kind of “effort tax,” are working against customers’ interests, and companies 
are aware of that fact. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission 
has expressed serious concerns about this kind of marketing.159 
It is easy to imagine both private and public analogues. Inertia, en-
dorsement, and loss aversion might ensure that default rules stick, at least to 
some extent, even if they are not in people’s interests. Consider, for exam-
ple, an automatic enrollment policy that puts an unreasonably large per-
centage of employees’ salaries into savings, or that enrolls them in a health 
insurance plan that is a bad deal for their circumstances, or that signs them 
up for an exercise plan that they do not need, do not use, and perhaps hate. 
Automatic enrollment can be a waste or even a disaster.  
Lest this point be misunderstood, recall that the risk, important and 
troubling though it is, does not argue against default rules in general. We 
cannot do without them. (Active choosing is a qualification, to be discussed 
very shortly.) The question is which ones are best, not whether to have one. 
And for reasons discussed above, the risk should not be overstated. We have 
seen that extreme defaults do not stick when and because people have 
preferences that are independent of the default rule, and are willing to 
expend effort to set things right. Nonetheless, harmful defaults can and do 
impose significant burdens and costs, not least because inertia may not be so 
easy to overcome, and many consumers may think that they were chosen for 
a good and legitimate reason. Recall in particular that low-income people 
are, in certain circumstances at least, especially unlikely to opt out—a 
finding that suggests that default rules may prove especially harmful to 
people who can least afford to be harmed. 
To evaluate the use of automatic enrollment, the particular circumstances 
certainly matter. If automatic enrollment is not made clear and transparent 
to those who are enrolled, it can be considered a form of manipulation. The 
problem is worse if it is not in people’s long-term interest. 
V. ACTIVE CHOOSING 
The discussion thus far suggests a number of potential problems with 
impersonal default rules.160 A distinctive approach, responsive to those 
problems and sometimes worth serious consideration, is this: Avoid any 
 
159 See FTC, supra note 157, at 5 (discussing the various problems posed by negative option 
marketing). 
160 See also Brown et al., supra note 63, at 29 (concluding that impersonal defaults could be 
troubling in complex and high-stakes situations and could lead to regret and welfare loss). 
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default rule and call for active choices.161 Those who greatly distrust private or 
public institutions, and who want to avoid any kind of steering by them, 
will have considerable interest in active choices. They will want to reject 
default rules of any kind and put the key questions to people themselves. 
As we shall see, this approach has special advantages in the face of hetero-
geneity—especially if default rules would otherwise be impersonal. 
Note that active choosing comes in two varieties: optional and required. 
When people visit a grocery store or shop for cell phones or sneakers, they 
make an active choice, but they can leave the store immediately without 
any kind of adverse effect; no sanction is imposed if they fail to make a 
selection. If, by contrast, people are told that they cannot receive a driver’s 
license without saying whether they want to be organ donors, an active 
choice is essentially required. Admittedly, the line between optional and 
required active choosing is not clear; in all cases, something happens if 
one does not make an active choice (for example, no groceries and no cell 
phone). My focus here is on required active choosing. 
A. Life Without Defaults? 
1. The Basic Idea 
With active choices, people are required to make an actual decision 
among the various options; they are not defaulted into any particular 
alternative. With respect to healthcare, privacy, organ donation, and 
savings, for example, choice architects might reject both opt-out and opt-
in and simply require people to indicate their preferences. It is worthwhile 
to underline the potential advantages of active choosing in nations and 
cultures in which certain issues (such as organ donation) are highly 
sensitive, and in which people would greatly resist the idea of being 
defaulted into outcomes that they might believe to be intrusive or offensive. 
I shall have a fair bit to say in support of active choosing, but we 
should note three important complications at the outset. First, what does 
it mean to “require” people to indicate their preferences? Those who insist 
on the inevitability of default rules will object that there is no good 
answer to this question. Even if choice architects seek to promote active 
choosing, they have to specify what happens if people simply refuse to choose. 
Isn’t the answer some kind of default rule? 
 
161 See, e.g., Carroll et al., supra note 62, at 1641-43 (describing an experiment involving an 
“active decision regime” in which employees were required to make active choices regarding their 
401(k) retirement plans). 
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The question is a good one, because some kind of default rule is ulti-
mately necessary. For defenders of active choosing, the best response is 
that when active choosing is required, choice architects implement it 
through a sanction that is so severe that it is the functional equivalent of a 
mandate. For example, a state might say that unless people indicate 
whether they want to be organ donors, they cannot receive their driver’s 
licenses. Or an employer might say that unless employees indicate their 
preferences for a retirement plan or for health insurance, they cannot 
begin to work. It remains true that people can simply refuse, in which case 
a default rule does apply (nonenrollment); but this point need not greatly 
disturb those who believe in active choosing. 
The second complication, and an especially interesting one, is that 
some people do or would prefer not to choose. In that sense, active 
choosing is itself a nudge, a form of libertarian paternalism, and not a 
refusal to engage in the whole project. Some choosers undoubtedly have a 
second-order preference not to choose, and active choosing overrides that 
preference. It calls for choosing even in circumstances in which choosers, 
faced with the option, would choose not to choose. Those who prefer 
active choosing are not avoiding nudges; they are nudging those who do 
not want to choose. They are not avoiding libertarian paternalism; they 
are engaging in it. One form of libertarian paternalism favors choosing, 
and advocates of that form of libertarian paternalism will steer people in 
favor of active choice—an approach that embeds a form of paternalism 
insofar as some people would prefer not to choose. As we will see, however, 
advocates of active choosing might be able to contend that these claims 
miss their central points, and they do have some good reasons in favor of 
their preferred approach. 
The third complication is that while active choosing is designed to 
elicit people’s preferences, and to do so in a neutral fashion, the very 
decision to require active choosing might contain a “signal,” and that 
signal might affect choosers. Suppose, for example, that the default rule 
has been nonenrollment in an organ donation plan, and that in order to 
promote organ donation, a state shifts to active choosing. We can imagine 
three potential outcomes. First, people might now simply indicate their 
preferences; they might be genuinely unaffected by the signal. Second, the 
shift might signal the state’s view that organ donation is a good idea—and 
hence the organ donation rate might increase because people receive, and 
trust, that signal. Third, the signal might indicate the state’s view that 
organ donation is a good idea, and people might receive, and distrust, that 
signal, thus reducing participation below the level that was seen with a 
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nonenrollment default. We could imagine any of these three outcomes, 
depending on the strength of the signal and people’s reactions to it. 
Notwithstanding these points, inertia matters, and it is reasonable to 
speculate that active choosing would usually produce higher participation 
rates than an opt-in system but lower than an opt-out system. The specu-
lation is supported by what we currently know. For example, active choos-
ing has been found to result in far higher levels of savings than default rules 
that require people to opt in (but lower than in the case of automatic enroll-
ment).162 Or return to the question of privacy. Most web browsers currently 
default people into a situation in which their movements are visible and can 
be tracked. Another possibility would be to ask customers—either the first 
time they open the browser or periodically—about the privacy setting that 
they prefer, and perhaps to prevent them from proceeding until they 
answer. A reasonable guess is that this approach would produce more 
privacy than they currently enjoy.163 
2. Active, but Influenced, Choosing 
It is also possible to imagine a host of variations on active choosing. 
We could even identify a continuum of approaches from the most neutral 
form of active choosing to forms of active choosing that choice architects 
self-consciously attempt to influence. For example, active choosing might 
be “enhanced,” or influenced, in the sense that one of the choices might be 
highlighted or favored, perhaps through the use of behaviorally informed 
strategies.164 If choice architects intend to avoid a default rule but none-
theless want to promote selection of one of the options, they might list it 
first, or use a bold or large font, or adopt verbal descriptions that make it 
especially salient or appealing.  
In one study, choice was “enhanced” by enlisting loss aversion to dis-
courage selection of the option disfavored by the experimenters.165 The 
experimenters introduced several different messages in the following way: 
 
162 Id. at 1670 (highlighting the results of the 401(k) experiment testing active choice). 
163 Whether that would be desirable is, of course, another question. Recall that information is 
a public good and individually rational decisions in favor of protecting privacy might produce less 
information than is desirable. See Johnson et al., supra note 48. For some empirical complications, 
see Willis, supra note 121. 
164 See Punam Anand Keller et al., Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to Motivate Behav-
ior Change, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 376, 378 (2011) (arguing that “enhanced active choice,” 
which communicates the preferred choice by highlighting the losses incumbent in the nonpre-
ferred alternative, will result in more compliance than “basic active choice”). 
165 Id. at 379. 
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We would like you to imagine that you are interested in protecting 
your health. The Center for Disease Control indicates that a flu shot 
significantly reduces the risk of getting or passing on the flu virus. 
Your employer tells you about a hypothetical program that recom-
mends you get a flu shot this Fall and possibly save $50 off your bi-
weekly or monthly health insurance contribution cost.166 
In the opt-in condition, people were asked to “Place a check in the box if 
you will get a Flu shot this Fall.”167 In a “neutral active-choice condition,” 
people were asked to “Place a check in one box: I will get a flu shot this 
Fall or, I will not get a flu shot this Fall.”168 With “enhanced or influenced 
choice,” people were asked to choose between two alternatives: “I will get 
a Flu Shot this Fall to reduce my risk of getting the flu and I want to save 
$50” or “I will not get a Flu Shot this Fall even if it means I may increase 
my risk of getting the flu and I don’t want to save $50.”169 Compared to 
the opt-in condition, the active-choice condition led to a significant 
increase in the percentage of people who would get a flu shot; the per-
centage was highest when active choice was influenced.170  
There is an obvious parallel here with the efforts of banks to promote 
opt-out by enlisting loss aversion and other behaviorally informed strategies. 
The principal point is that active choosing can be more or less neutral 
with respect to the relevant options. As the choice architect becomes 
decreasingly neutral, active choosing starts to look closer to a default rule. 
B. In Favor of Active Choosing 
Let us put the question of influence to one side and assume that if 
choice architects favor active choosing, they will remain neutral and not 







171 A growing literature explores, or has implications for, the topic of active choosing. See 
Carroll et al., supra note 62, at 1670-72 (asserting that an active decision framework may be 
particularly attractive in 401(k) enrollment); see also Bruce Carlin et al., Libertarian Paternalism, 
Information Sharing, and Financial Decision-Making 5 (Mar. 12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/manso/liberty.pdf (arguing for a judicious use of 
libertarian paternalism so as not to stifle social learning and the development of self-corrective 
behavior). 
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1. Overcoming Inertia 
Because a decision is required, active choosing overcomes inertia. If in-
ertia and procrastination are playing a significant role, active choosing may 
be far better than opt-in. Active choosing requires people to incur effort 
costs that might otherwise lead them to focus on other matters. Consider 
savings plans, health insurance, and privacy settings. The problem with opt-
in in those situations is that it will likely ensure that some people end up 
with outcomes that they would not prefer if they were to make a choice. A 
key virtue of active choosing is that it increases the likelihood that people 
will end up with their desired outcomes.  
2. Overcoming Error-Prone or Nefarious-Choice Architects 
I have noted that active choosing is a safeguard against uninformed or 
self-interested choice architects. When choice architects lack relevant 
information, so that the chosen rule might be harmful to some or many, 
there are significant advantages to active choosing. Suppose that a private 
institution is producing the default rule, and it really does not know a great 
deal about what informed people would choose. In the context of ice cream 
flavors, tablets, cell phones, and sneakers, people tend to know what they 
like, and while advice may be welcome, active choosing is far better than an 
impersonal default rule. The same is true for many activities and goods 
provided by private institutions. Market pressures can lead such institutions 
to a good mix of default rules and active choosing that fits the desires of 
diverse customers. 
Or suppose that the government is producing the default rule. If public 
officials are biased or inadequately informed, and if the default rule is no 
better than a guess, that rule might lead people in the wrong direction. 
Followers of Friedrich Hayek, emphasizing “the knowledge problem,”172 
assert that public officials will inevitably know less than participants in the 
market do.173 An appreciation of the knowledge problem might well argue in 
favor of active choosing. The same point argues against a default rule, and in 
favor of active choosing, when self-interested private groups are calling for 
government to select it even though it would not benefit those on whom it 
is imposed. Active choosing is much less risky on these counts. If we do not 
 
172 See Hayek, supra note 30, at 519-20 (emphasizing local and decentralized information). 
173  See, e.g., L. Lynne Kiesling, Knowledge Problem (manuscript at 15-16), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/id=2001633 (arguing that “made” institutions, those created through 
administrative or legislative procedure, may actually exacerbate the knowledge problem), in Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Austrian Economics (Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne eds.) (forthcoming 2013). 
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trust public officials—perhaps because they do not know everything, 
perhaps because their motivations may not be pure—we might like active 
choosing best.174 
3. Learning and Development of Preferences 
Active choosing promotes learning and thus the development of prefer-
ences. Choice architects might know that a certain outcome is in the 
interest of most people, but they might also believe that it is independently 
important for people to learn about the underlying questions so that they 
can use the “stock” of what they learn to make choices in multiple areas in 
the future. In the context of financial decisions, it may be valuable for 
people to develop the kinds of understandings that will enable them to 
choose well for themselves. We could easily imagine a kind of science 
fiction, envisioning a Brave New World in which people are defaulted into a 
large number of good outcomes but are thereby deprived of agency and 
learning. If some people fear that nudging and default rules threaten to 
infantilize people, the underlying concern may be here. And while the 
objection should not be overstated, there are certainly domains in which 
learning is important and active choosing is necessary to promote it. 
4. Accommodating Changes over Time 
Impersonal default rules are usually static, and if situations change over 
time, such rules might become suboptimal even if they were sensible when 
originally imposed.175 By contrast, active choosing could be designed in such 
a way as to require periodic revelation of a chooser’s preferences. In theory, 
of course, impersonal default rules could also change over time to become 
less impersonal (as a result of learning by choice architects). But even if so, 
they might less accurately reflect a chooser’s preference than would active 
choosing. 
 
174 See REBONATO, supra note 16, at 221-26 (questioning whether the government can act as 
a “benevolent nudger”). 
175 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, 
and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 67, 70 (2002) (finding that in the case of 
savings plans, employees followed the plan of least resistance and did not opt out even when they 
had the opportunity to do so). 
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5. Paternalism and Its Discontents 
Defenders of default rules favor nudges, or libertarian paternalism; they 
seek to maintain freedom of choice.176 They contend that if we bracket the 
possibility of active choosing, a default rule is inevitable, and hence a form 
of paternalism is inevitable as well. As we have seen, they add that active 
choosing itself involves nudging, and therefore a form of libertarian 
paternalism. These points seem convincing, but active choosing is indeed 
different from default rules in the important sense that with such rules, 
nothing happens unless choosers affirmatively indicate their wishes.177 If we 
reject paternalism—perhaps because of distrust of choice architects, perhaps 
because of a commitment to learning, perhaps because of a belief that 
individual choice is a good in itself—then active choosing will seem quite 
appealing. 
In addition, there appears to be an asymmetry in public perceptions, and 
the asymmetry may argue on behalf of active choosing. In particular, people 
appear to see automatic enrollment as paternalistic and as requiring special 
justification; by contrast, they see automatic nonenrollment as not paternalistic 
and as requiring no such justification.178 Indeed, they tend to see active 
choosing and nonenrollment as equally nonpaternalistic.179 These findings 
are closely associated with the finding that people understand automatic 
enrollment as a signal that choice architects endorse enrollment, even 
though they do not view automatic nonenrollment as a signal that choice 
architects favor nonenrollment.  
By themselves, these points are hardly decisive objections to automatic 
enrollment. But if choice architects are concerned about public reactions, 
and in particular about objections to paternalism, they might favor active 
choosing for that reason. 
6. Heterogeneity 
Finally, active choosing appropriately handles diversity. As compared 
with either opt-in or opt-out systems, active choosing can have major 
advantages when the relevant group is heterogeneous, so that a single 
approach is unlikely to fit diverse circumstances. If one size does not fit all 
 
176 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5 (arguing that libertarian paternalism is 
“liberty preserving”).  
177 Of course it is also true that some background sanction must be in place to “require” ac-
tive choosing, and some kind of default rule must attach if people simply refuse to choose. 
178 Tannenbaum & Ditto, supra note 83, at 7-8. 
179 Id. 
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for health insurance or savings plans, then choice architects might want to 
ensure that people make choices on their own. For this reason, active 
choosing may be far better. In the face of diversity, an impersonal default 
rule may be especially harmful, because the power of inertia, or the force of 
suggestion, may mean that many people will end up in a situation that is 
not in their interest. People might be far better off if they are asked, “What 
health insurance plan do you like best?” than if they are automatically 
enrolled in a plan chosen by their employer. 
C. Against Active Choosing 
Notwithstanding its potential benefits, active choosing could also create 
serious problems, and it is hardly the right approach in all situations. To see 
why, consider the words of Esther Duflo, one of the world’s leading experts 
on poverty: 
[W]e tend to be patronizing about the poor in a very specific sense, which is 
that we tend to think, “Why don’t they take more responsibility for their 
lives?” And what we are forgetting is that the richer you are the less respon-
sibility you need to take for your own life because everything is taken care 
for you. And the poorer you are the more you have to be responsible for 
everything about your life. . . . [S]top berating people for not being re-
sponsible and start to think of ways instead of providing the poor with the 
luxury that we all have, which is that a lot of decisions are taken for us. If 
we do nothing, we are on the right track. For most of the poor, if they do 
nothing, they are on the wrong track.180 
Duflo’s central claim is that people who are well off do not have to be 
responsible for a wide range of things, because others are making the 
relevant decisions for their benefit. In countless domains, choices are in fact 
“taken for us.” Such steps not only increase our welfare but also promote 
our autonomy, because our time is freed up to spend on other matters.181 We 
do not have to decide how and whether to make water safe to drink or air 
safe to breathe; we do not have to decide how to build roads and refrigera-
tors and airplanes; the alphabet is given to us, not chosen by us. It is true 
and important that we may participate in numerous decisions through 
 
180 Susan Parker, Esther Duflo Explains Why She Believes Randomized Controlled Trials Are So 
Vital, THE CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY BLOG (June 23, 2011), http:// 
www.effectivephilanthropy.org/blog/2011/06/esther-duflo-explains-why-she-believes-randomized-
controlled-trials-are-so-vital. 
181 See Shah et al., supra note 32, at 684-85 (describing how scarcity conditions draw attention 
to immediate needs, often hindering more efficient planning). 
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politics and markets. But often we rely on the fact that choices are made by 
others, and we go about our business without troubling ourselves about 
them. This is a blessing, not a curse. 
These points suggest an initial problem with active choosing, which is 
that it can impose large burdens on choosers. That burden may in fact be 
quite unwelcome. Suppose that the situation is unfamiliar and complicated. 
Suppose that people lack information or experience. If so, active choosing 
may impose unjustified or excessive costs on people; it might produce 
frustration and appear to require pointless red tape. Most consumers would 
not much like it if, at the time of purchase, they had to choose every feature 
of their cell phone plan or all of their computer’s initial settings. The 
existence of defaults saves people a lot of time, and most of these defaults 
may well be sensible and suitable. Few consumers would like to spend the 
time required to obtain relevant information and to decide what choice to 
make. As compared to a default rule, active choosing increases the costs of 
decisions, possibly significantly. 
At the same time, active choosing can impose large burdens on providers 
of goods or services. For them, defaults can be desirable and even important 
because it allows them to avoid costs, which might result in increases in 
prices (and thus harm consumers as well). Without a series of default rules, 
significant resources might have to be devoted to patient, tedious explana-
tions and to going through the various options with consumers or users, 
who might not welcome the exercise. The experience of buying a cell phone 
or a laptop might be horrific if active choosing were required for many 
product characteristics. We could easily imagine a bit of science fiction, or 
perhaps a situation comedy, that makes this point especially vivid. 
A final point is that active choosing can increase errors. The goal of ac-
tive choosing is to make people better off by overcoming the potential 
mistakes of choice architects. But if the area is unfamiliar, highly technical, 
and confusing, active choosing might have the opposite effect. If consumers 
are required to answer a set of technical questions, and if the choice archi-
tects know what they are doing, then people will probably enjoy better 
outcomes with defaults. Perhaps it would be best to rely on experiments or 
pilot studies that elicit choices from informed people, and then to use those 
choices to build defaults. But if choice architects have technical expertise, 
and are trustworthy, there is a question whether this exercise would be 
worthwhile. 
  
48 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1 
 
VI. PERSONALIZED DEFAULT RULES 
My focus thus far has been on default rules that are impersonal in the 
sense that they apply to all members of the relevant population, subject to 
the ability to opt-out. But as I have noted, some default rules are highly 
personalized. Such approaches draw on available information about which 
approach best suits different groups of people, and potentially each individ-
ual person, in the relevant population.  
A. The Best of Both Worlds? 
We could imagine a continuum of personalized approaches, from the 
most fine-grained to the far more crude. In principle, choice architects could 
design default rules for every one of us. Perhaps this idea seems far-fetched, 
but in the fullness of time, private and public institutions are likely to use a 
large number of personalized default rules. In fact we are already heading in 
that direction. Smartphone data, for example, can be (and has been) mined 
to ascertain personality traits, and those traits can in turn be used to 
personalize services on smartphones.182 We can easily imagine the use of 
website browsing data to personalize a range of services and default options. 
Google already does something quite like this. In many contexts, it will be 
possible to move from active choosing to personalized default rules, as 
choice architects build such defaults for individuals on the basis of what 
they have actively chosen in the past.  
In their ideal form, personalized default rules might be thought to pro-
duce the best of both worlds. Like impersonal default rules, they reduce the 
burdens of decision and simplify life. But like active choosing, they promote 
individualization and increase accuracy by overcoming the many problems 
associated with one-size-fits-all approaches. 
Of course the idea of personalized default rules raises serious concerns. 
Some of these involve narrowing one’s horizons; others involve personal 
privacy. I shall turn to those concerns in due course. But at least in some 
contexts, the design of such personalized rules would be a great boon. The 
key advantage of such rules is that they are likely to be more fine-grained 
and thus beneficial than “mass” default rules.183 As technology evolves and 
 
182 See generally Gokul Chittaranjan et al., Mining Large-Scale Smartphone Data for Person-
ality Studies (Oct. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://publications.idiap.ch/ 
downloads/papers/2011/Chittaranjan_PUC_2012.pdf (analyzing the relationship between behavioral 
characteristics derived from smartphone data and certain self-reported personality traits). 
183 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 423-24 (contrasting persistent and smart de-
faults, two kinds of personalized default rules, with mass defaults). 
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information accumulates, it should become increasingly possible to produce 
highly personalized defaults, based on people’s own choices and situations. 
For this reason, there will be promising opportunities to use default rules to 
promote people’s welfare.  
Every day, family members and friends use the equivalent of personal-
ized default rules. They tend to know what people like in various domains. 
With respect to conversation, food, restaurants, vacations, romance, and 
more, they use those personalized defaults for people’s benefit. They do not 
ask, in every case, for an active choice, which would make life more compli-
cated and potentially even intolerable. Sometimes spouses order for one 
another at restaurants or select clothing for each other, using the functional 
equivalent of default rules and pursuant to an implicit delegation.184 Indeed, 
a large part of what it means to be a spouse, a partner, or a close friend is to 
be able to identify personalized defaults. (By contrast, strangers rely on 
impersonal ones, which may cause big trouble.) 
Especially as technology develops, an important function of marketing 
and marketing research should be to gather knowledge of this kind (subject 
to safeguards for privacy, taken up below). Indeed, such marketing and 
research might well become—and now appear to be becoming—standard 
fare.185 Similar efforts are being made in the area of political campaigning as 
well, with something close to the functional equivalent of personalized 
defaults.186 




Notwithstanding their many virtues, personalized default rules are not 
without disadvantages, even if we put privacy to one side. Most obviously, 
they do not promote learning, and hence they do not promote and may 
impede the development of (increasingly) informed preferences. Consider 
the context of health insurance. People might be defaulted into a plan that 
suits their needs, which seems unobjectionable—but if so, they do not have 
 
184 A cautionary note here, at once amusing and sad, suggests that people often make signifi-
cant mistakes about what their family members and friends like. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, 
SCROOGENOMICS 29-39 (2009) (highlighting Christmas as a prime example of “inefficient gift 
giving” to loved ones). 
185 See, e.g., Chittaranjan et al., supra note 182, at 4-5 (illustrating the use of a mobile software 
program to research the personality traits of participants). 
186 See Benedict Carey, Academic ‘Dream Team’ Helped Obama’s Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2012, at D1 (exploring defaults in the context of voting and politics). 
187 I am grateful to Daniel Tannenbaum for pressing the points in this Section. 
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the opportunity to learn, which might prove important in the long term. 
Perhaps it is best to require active choosing, so that people know more about 
health insurance and about their health care needs. Learning can be im-
portant, and active choosing promotes learning while defaults do not. 
Or consider the analogy of books and music. We have seen that on the 
basis of one’s past choices, it is possible, indeed easy, to offer advice, or even 
to suggest defaults, that reflect what one likes. If you have liked books by a 
certain mystery writer or science fiction writer, there is a good chance that 
you will like books by other identifiable mystery writers or science fiction 
writers. If you have liked music by certain singer–songwriters, companies 
can identify other singer–songwriters whom you will enjoy; this is how 
Pandora works its magic.188 But people’s preferences change over time, 
especially if they are able to learn, and if people are defaulted into options 
that simply reflect their current “likes,” such learning will not occur. In 
multiple domains, serendipity has great value, as people encounter, entirely 
serendipitously, activities and products that do not in any way reflect their 
past choices. The problem, in short, is that if defaults are based on such 
choices, the process of development might be stunted. When your experiences 
are closely tailored to your past choices, your defaults are personalized, but 
you will also be far less likely to develop new tastes, preferences, and values. 
In the context of communications generally, some people have expressed 
concern about the risks associated with an “architecture of control,” in which 
people create a kind of “Daily Me”—an informational universe that is 
entirely self-selected.189 Imagine, for example, that people are able to use 
perfect filters, so that they can see and hear what they want and exclude 
everything else. In some ways, this would be a great boon, and we do appear 
to be moving in its direction. Now imagine that if producers learn about 
your past choices, they could, very much in the style of Pandora, provide 
you with other things that you want to see and hear—so that the method of 
selection is based on projections from your past choices. This too might be 
a great boon. But insofar as it ensures a kind of narrowing, and prevents 
people from expanding their horizons, it is nothing to celebrate. Personal-
ized echo chambers may produce individual and social harm.190 An “archi-
tecture of serendipity” has large advantages. 
 
188 Pandora is a free Internet radio that allows users to create stations on the basis of a single 
song. The station then plays songs with similar characteristics. See http://www.pandora.com/about. 
189 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 94 (2007) (arguing that this “Daily Me” uni-
verse can promote extremism and stifle cooperative behavior). 
190 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES 2 (2008) (explaining that 
“[w]hen people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they are especially likely to move 
to extremes.”). 
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A genuinely extreme case would be a political system with personalized 
voting defaults, so that people are defaulted into voting for the candidate or 
party suggested by their previous votes, subject to opt-out. In such a 
system, people would be presumed to vote consistently with their past 
votes, to such an extent that they need not show up at the voting booth at 
all, unless they wanted to indicate a surprising or contrary preference. Such 
a system would not entirely lack logic. It would certainly reduce the burdens 
and costs of voting, especially for voters themselves, who could avoid a trip 
to the polls, assured that the system would register their preferences.  
But there is a (devastating) problem with an approach of this kind, 
which has to do with what might be called the internal morality of voting. 
The very act of voting is supposed to represent an active choice, in which 
voters are selecting among particular candidates. In other contexts, there is 
not an equivalent internal morality, but active choosing is an individual and 
social good precisely because it promotes learning over time, and thus the 
development of informed, broadened, and perhaps new preferences. 
Personalized default rules have other disadvantages. We have seen that 
people tend to stick with the default, and this is true whether it is impersonal 
or personalized. Sticking with the default can lead to feelings of regret. 
There is empirical support for this proposition: In the context of retirement 
plans, those who passively stayed with the default showed more regret than 
those who engaged in active choosing.191 It is possible that such regret will 
amount to a significant welfare loss.  
In addition, passive choice will, almost by definition, decrease choosers’ 
feelings of identification with the outcome. In part for that reason, any kind 
of default rule, including a highly personalized one, may not create the 
kinds of motivation that can come from active choosing. Suppose that 
choice architects seek to promote healthy behavior. They might use some-
thing akin to default rules of certain kinds (involving, for example, portion 
size and easy availability of certain foods). Such an approach may be 
effective, but it may not have certain benefits associated with active choosing, 
such as increased self-monitoring and stronger intrinsic motivations. 
A separate objection applies to default rules of all kinds: People may like 
choosing, and default rules deprive them of something that they like. 
Consider the experience of ordering from a menu at a restaurant. Some 
people affirmatively favor a situation in which they receive a number of 
options and can make their own selections from the list. When people like 
to choose, there is an argument for active choosing and against any sort of 
 
191 Brown et al., supra note 63, at 21-22. 
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default rule. It is natural, and not false, to answer that if they want to 
choose, they can do so even in the presence of a default. But for many 
people in many contexts, it is better to be presented with a menu of options, 
and to be asked for their preference, than to be provided with a default, and 
to be asked whether they want to depart from it. 
2. Abstractions and Concrete Cases 
These points—about narrowing, regret, chooser identification, and valuing 
the experience of choice—should not be taken as decisive, certainly not in 
the abstract. It is one thing to worry about a narrow communications 
universe; it is quite another thing to worry about a highly personalized 
retirement plan, or health insurance plan, or credit card plan. In the latter 
cases, learning may or may not be important, but personalization (so long as 
it is accurate) does not appear to threaten individual or social harm. Wheth-
er narrowing in the form of personalization is a blessing or instead a curse 
depends on the situation.192 
We have seen that in many contexts, people would prefer a default. 
More generally, personalized default rules may have benefits that dwarf the 
costs, even when the costs are real. While such defaults do not have all of 
the advantages of actual choice, they have many of them, and at the same 
time they promise to overcome most of the problems associated with 
impersonal defaults. Above all, they can handle the problem of heterogeneity, 
and thus accurately reflect preferences, without imposing the burdens and 
costs associated with active choosing.193  
C. Tracking and Extrapolating 
A personalized default might be based on people’s own past choices or 
on those of people “like them.” Consider, for example, Amazon.com, which 
provides recommendations to its customers on the basis of their past 
 
192 Note that if the relevant program is designed to promote risk pooling, it makes sense to 
default everyone into the same risk pool, and under plausible assumptions, to forbid opt-out. By 
its very nature, a system that is intended to pool risks is unlikely to use default rules, impersonal 
or personalized. 
193 Special questions might be raised by the potential creation of “personalized prices.” Typi-
cal price systems name a single price for a good or service, even though people who are subject to 
that price would be willing to pay widely varying amounts for precisely the same items. Smith 
might be willing to pay far more than Jones for the same tablet or meal, perhaps because Smith is 
wealthier or because Smith has stronger preferences. The various questions raised by the 
possibility of personalized prices deserve a separate discussion. 
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choices.194 Amazon.com knows that if customers like books by a certain 
author, they will probably like books by another author as well. Ama-
zon.com might be thought to have created something in the general vicinity 
of default rules in the form of visible, salient choices. Of course the presen-
tation of such choices is akin to advice and not literally a default in the 
sense that if customers do nothing, they will purchase nothing. But the same 
technologies could easily be used to create defaults of multiple kinds. 
Once enough information is available about Smith, choice architects 
could design default rules for Smith with respect to health insurance, 
privacy, rental car agreements, computer settings, and so on. For some 
services, including travel, personalized defaults have become familiar and 
common. If a website knows where customers like to sit on an airplane, 
when they like to travel, which airlines they prefer, and how they like to pay, 
it can use this information to generate outcomes (subject to customer 
revision).195 Personalized default rules can also be dynamic, in the sense that 
they can change over time. In principle they could incorporate new infor-
mation in real time. The best default rules or settings for a particular person 
in one year might be very different from those in the next year. The default 
rules could change on a daily or even hourly basis. As private and public 
institutions receive increasing amounts of information about each of us, this 
project is becoming increasingly feasible. Multiple websites are already 
moving in this direction, providing defaults for people based on their own 
past choices. In general, those defaults make life simpler and more conven-
ient.196 
We could imagine a large variety of possibilities here. In some cases, 
defaults might be based directly on people’s own past choices. Return to the 
travel setting: If you make certain choices in the past, you will be defaulted 
into the same choices in the future. In other cases, defaults might involve a 
degree of extrapolation from those choices. Choice architects might think 
that if people have made certain choices with respect to privacy in the 
domain of health insurance, they are likely to make certain choices with 
respect to privacy in other domains as well. Consider the familiar idea that 
if certain consumers actually like certain products, they may like certain 
other products as well. If sufficient data is available, personalized default 
rules might be generated in this way. 
 
194 See Amazon Advertising Preferences, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/dra/info? 
ie=UTF8&ref_=ya_advertising_preferences (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
195 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 424 (explaining that “[a] persistent defaults 
policy takes as a default that which the person chose last time”). 
196 See Smith et al., supra note 135, at 18-20 (discussing how consumer sales or marketing 
websites can use “smart” and “adaptive” defaults to understand and help serve customers). 
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D. Information Acquisition and Privacy 
1. Feasibility 
With respect to personalized defaults, one challenge involves feasibility.  
For defaults to be personalized, choice architects must obtain relevant 
information. In some contexts, obtaining such information is essentially 
costless. On websites, people make repeated choices, and if choice architects 
know what they usually choose, they can make that usual choice the default. 
Return to the case of travel preferences, or consider shipping times and 
credit cards for book purchases. But in other cases, there will be no such 
track record, at least at the beginning, and acquisition of relevant infor-
mation will be costly or perhaps impossible. Suppose, for example, that 
people are purchasing new computers, and the question is the appropriate 
privacy setting for them. By hypothesis, choice architects will lack the 
necessary information. Personalized default rules will not be feasible. 
2. Privacy 
Even if personalization is feasible, there is an additional challenge, 
which is that if defaults are based on people’s past choices, there is a poten-
tially serious concern about privacy. By hypothesis, choice architects can 
identify people’s past choices, and some choosers will not be delighted by 
that fact. People might well object if others know that they tend to like 
(say) silly science fiction novels—and that for that reason, they are being 
defaulted into a wide range of choices favored by people who like such novels.  
We might make a distinction here. First, certain choice architects—those 
who operate relevant programs or websites—might simply know about 
people’s past choices; if people are purchasing goods from them, such 
knowledge would seem inevitable (though there may be retention issues).197 
Second, and alternatively, the choice architects who are receiving that 
information as a result of commercial interactions might take the further 
step of revealing those choices to independent people and providers. On 
one view, such revelations would facilitate mutually agreeable interactions, 
but it is easily imaginable that some choosers would object to those revela-
tions. If they object to the latter, sharing of that kind should probably not be 
 
197 One safeguard for privacy might include the nonretention of information after a specified 
period of time. Perhaps people could be asked to indicate their preferences (that is, make an active 
choice with respect to retention), or perhaps people could be subject to an impersonal (for 
example, retention unless indicated otherwise, or vice versa) or a personalized default. 
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permitted—and a prohibition on sharing will make it harder to generate 
personalized defaults. 
There is a potential solution to the privacy problem, which is that choice 
architects might use, with respect to privacy itself, either (1) active choosing 
or (2) personalized default rules. Perhaps choice architects should ask Jones 
explicitly about her preferences with respect to privacy. Or perhaps choice 
architects know that Jones is fiercely protective of her privacy and that in 
the face of any kind of doubt, she prefers to prevent other people from 
knowing about her behavior and her choices. If so, that very knowledge can 
be used to produce privacy-protective default rules. In the case of doubt, 
active choosing might be selected so that people do not give up privacy 
unless they explicitly state their willingness to do so. With respect to 
privacy, there is a great deal of heterogeneity and a risk of self-interested 
judgments on the part of choice architects, both of which argue for active 
choosing. 
E. Demographics 
Less ambitiously, personalized default rules might be based on group 
characteristics, such as geographic or demographic variables.198 For example, 
age and income might be used in determining appropriate default rules for 
retirement plans. In fact, this approach is already standard practice. For 
example, universities typically default faculty members into what seems to 
be an appropriate plan (subject of course to an easy out). With respect to 
employees over sixty, the default allocation might be different from what it 
would be with respect to employees who are thirty. For those with large 
incomes, the default might be different from what it would be for those who 
are making a smaller amount. The general idea is that your default rules 
would track what would be best for “people like you.”  
Evidence suggests that for retirement plans, default rules that respect 
diversity (especially with respect to age) are indeed feasible, and they can 
increase the probability of enrollment in the default plan by sixty percent.199 
Default rules can also create very large gains for participants.200 Life-cycle 
 
198 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 424 (discussing how and why smart defaults 
take into account individual measurements like group and location). 
199 See Gopi Shah Goda & Coleen Flaherty Manchester, Incorporating Employee Heterogeneity 
into Default Rules for Retirement Plan Selection 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 16099, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16099 (studying the effects on 
retirement plan choices when the default plan is altered based on participant age). 
200 See id. at 29 (“Substantial welfare gains are possible by varying defaults by observable 
characteristics.”). 
  
56 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1 
 
and life-stage funds do exactly this, and they are increasingly common. We 
could easily imagine similar approaches to health insurance, credit cards, 
cell phones, mortgages, and much more. Of course, there might be con-
straints on the use of certain demographic variables—such as race, religion, 
and gender—if they would run afoul of principles of nondiscrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether or not we notice them, default rules are omnipresent. They 
establish settings for many activities and goods, including cell phones, rental 
car agreements, computers, savings plans, health insurance, and energy 
use.201 In countless domains, they identify the consequences if choosers do 
nothing. In part because of the power of inertia, default rules tend to stick.  
For private and public institutions, a central question is what happens if 
people do nothing, because nothing is exactly what people may do. Nor 
should default rules be disparaged. It should go without saying that freedom 
of choice is exceptionally important, but if people had to make choices 
about everything that affects their lives, they would end up drowning in an 
ocean of choices. Default rules of multiple kinds promote welfare because 
they make people’s lives go better; they can also promote autonomy, because 
they free up time for matters that are more pressing or important (or fun). 
To select among impersonal default rules, active choosing, and personalized 
default rules, a central question involves the costs of decisions and the costs 
of errors. When the relevant group is not diverse, and when an impersonal 
default rule will satisfy the informed preferences of the members of that 
group, it is generally most sensible to select that default rule rather than to 
require active choosing. And if the underlying issue is complex and unfamil-
iar, active choosing might be a burden rather than a benefit. If so, the 
argument for use of a default rule is fortified. But when the group is 
relevantly diverse, when choosing is actually preferred (perhaps because it is 
enjoyed and therefore a benefit rather than a cost), when learning is im-
portant, or when private or public institutions cannot be trusted or lack 
good information about which default rule is best, active choosing has 
significant advantages. It is especially important to emphasize the comparative 
advantages of active choosing, and the risks of default rules, when choice 
architects are uninformed or untrustworthy. 
 
201 See Steffen Altmann et al., Abstract to Incentives and Information As Driving Forces of 
Default Effects (Apr. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ewi-ssl.pitt.edu/ 
econ/files/seminars/120404_sem924_Steffen%20Altman.pdf (providing a valuable theoretical 
framework for when “decision makers should rationally follow default options instead of making 
active choices”). 
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Personalized default rules have the potential to reduce the problems as-
sociated with one-size-fits-all defaults, and thus to provide many of the 
benefits of active choosing, at least if the relevant choice architects are 
informed and trustworthy.202 In many domains, personalized default rules 
are the wave of the future. We should expect to see a significant increase in 
personalization as greater information becomes available about the informed 
choices of diverse people. The coming wave, very much in progress, will 
create serious risks, but it also promises to make our lives not only easier 
and simpler but also healthier and longer. 
 
 
202 Note that choice architects may be trustworthy because of market incentives (in the case 
of private institutions) or democratic checks (in the case of public institutions). Recall, however, 
that active choosing has the advantages of increasing learning and promoting the formation of 
preferences and values. 
